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ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS:
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF TRIPS ARTICLE 31BIS
Ezinne Miriam Igbokwe* & Andrea Tosato**
Abstract
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is one of
the cornerstones of the World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS requires all WTO
member countries (Members) to adopt minimum standards for the protection of
intellectual property (IP). This international treaty is highly controversial. Its critics
claim that TRIPS imposes a wealth transfer from poorer Members (net IP importers)
to richer ones (net IP exporters). Its supporters maintain that trade between
developing and developed economies cannot thrive without an internationallyharmonized IP framework. The most contentious issue has long been the impact of
the TRIPS patents regime on access to medicines.
Our Article contributes to this debate by illuminating an oft-overlooked facet of
TRIPS: Article 31bis. Enacted following the Doha Declaration of 2001, this
provision was designed to enable Members with inadequate manufacturing
capabilities to import patented pharmaceuticals produced by generics manufacturers
under an export compulsory license (ECL) issued by another Member. Initially
welcomed with enthusiasm, ECLs have enjoyed minimal success.
We propose an explanation for the current fallow state of Article 31bis and suggest
approaches to fulfill its promise. First, we identify and analyze the factors that deter
Members from making recourse to ECLs. Second, we posit that, under current law,
pooled procurement is the only viable avenue to exploit ECLs and elucidate
pathways for Members to pursue this strategy. Third, we advance the view that
TRIPS reform is necessary to unlock fully the potential of Article 31bis. We proffer
targeted amendments to enhance the flexibility and economic viability of ECLs,
detailing the ways in which these revisions would bolster the flow of patented
pharmaceuticals from the Global North to the Global South.
The Covid-19 pandemic has reawakened public opinion to the glaring disparity in
access to medicines worldwide. It has also exposed the unprecedented extent to
which production capacity for mRNA vaccines, antivirals, monoclonal antibodies
and other life-saving medicines is concentrated in a small number of wealthy
countries. It can only be hoped that this realization will spark the impetus to reform
Article31bis.
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INTRODUCTION
The attainment of equipoise between access to medicines1 and
pharmaceutical patents is as desirable as it is arduous.2 Throughout the 20th
century, lawmakers across the world struggled to balance stimulating the
development of new medical inventions through the patent system with
ensuring that citizens have affordable access to life-enhancing treatments.3
Their efforts yielded a broad spectrum of diverse solutions, which reflected
the underlying heterogeneity in social, political and economic realities. At
one end lay jurisdictions with privatized healthcare systems and unrestricted
patentability for pharmaceuticals;4 at the other, countries with universal
public healthcare coupled with a complete bar on medical patents.5 In
between lay a veritable galaxy of intermediate positions, typically blending
partially-subsidized healthcare with narrow protection of pharmaceutical
patents.6
Compulsory licensing of patents7 was often a fundamental tessera in these
complex mosaics.8 Shaped by a rich history, compulsory licenses (CL) share
a common core across all jurisdictions: they are a form of permission that a
government grants to a public or private entity to exploit the subject matter
of a patent without the consent of the patent holder.9 CLs constitute a
meaningful exception to the proprietary nature of patents. They loosen a
patentee’s otherwise complete control over the commercialization of the
protected invention.10
In their struggle to reach equilibrium between access to medicines and
pharmaceutical patents, countries relied on CLs in different ways. Some
utilized them purely as a remedy to chastise patentees that charged excessive
prices or artificially constrained supply. Other jurisdictions went a step

1

In this Article, we use the words “pharmaceuticals” and “medicines” synonymously.
The body of scholarship analyzing the interface between patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions and access to medicines is vast. See generally ELLEN F.M. ‘T
HOEN, PRIVATE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: CHANGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES
FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2016); VALBONA MUZAKA, THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES; Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H.
Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and
Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT. ECONOMIC
LAW 921 (2007); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317 (2005).
3
See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
5
See infra note 101-103 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
7
In this Article, we abbreviate the phrases “compulsory licensing of patents” and “patent
compulsory licenses” referring to “compulsory licensing” and “compulsory licenses”
respectively.
8
See infra notes 95, 116-120 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
10
See generally Daniel R. Cahoy, Breaking Patents, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 461 (2011);
Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047 (2009).
2
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further. They enacted special regimes that facilitated the issuance of CLs for
medical patents, with the declared intent of expanding access to medicines
and stimulating local biochemical manufacturing capabilities.11
Crucially, towards the end of 20th century, the policy choices made by
countries to balance access to medicines and medical patents evolved from a
domestic matter into a bone of international contention.12 “Developed
countries”13 which granted far-reaching patents for pharmaceutical
inventions increasingly called for worldwide adoption of protection levels
aligned with their own, bemoaning international drug piracy and free riding.14
“Developing countries”15 resisted these demands. They retorted that refusing
to award medical patents or liberally subjecting them to CLs was entirely
within their sovereign prerogative. They maintained that their priority was
safeguarding access to medicines for their citizens, rather than protecting the
revenue streams of foreign pharmaceutical companies.16
This impasse was broken with the birth of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO)17 and the annexed Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).18 In return for tariff-free access to the
agricultural and commodities markets of developed countries, developing
countries accepted that all WTO Members (Members) would be bound to
incorporate the intellectual property (IP) minimum standards articulated by
TRIPS into their domestic law.19 Crucially, this treaty mandates patent
protection for all types of technical inventions, including pharmaceutical

11

See infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
13
Though almost never precisely defined, the developed/developing countries
dichotomy is commonly used by international organizations, including the WTO, the United
Nations and the World Bank. Throughout this Article, the expression “developed countries”
is used to refer to “high income” countries as defined by the World Bank Atlas Method.
Coextensively, see the expression “developing countries” is used as an umbrella term to
encompass “upper-middle income”, “lower-middle income” and “low income” countries, as
defined by the World Bank Atlas Method. See World Bank, How Does the World Bank
Classify
Countries?
(World
Bank)
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-worldbank-classify-countries.
14
See generally Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993). See also JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 88–90 (providing a detailed analysis of the free-riding concerns linked
to pharmaceutical patents).
15
See supra note 13.
16
See generally Gutterman, supra note 14; A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent
System and Third World Development: Reality Or Myth, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831, 831–37
(1987).
17
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
18
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
19
See infra notes 133-149 and accompanying text.
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products and processes.20 Softening this bright-line rule, TRIPS includes
“flexibilities” that Members can utilize to curtail the rights of patentees,21
including the possibility of issuing CLs.22 However, Article 3123 imposes
limitations on their scope and duration, and specifies that CLs must be
“predominantly” for the supply of the market of the issuing Member.24
The TRIPS regime for medical inventions and CLs attracted vehement
criticisms, with some commentators going so far as to call it “structural
violence”.25 The Global North was accused of foisting its law upon the Global
South,26 establishing a “neo-colonial” international trade law framework that
would coerce formally sovereign, but economically dependent, developing
countries to recognize and enforce the property rights of developed
countries.27 In this novel legal order, medicines would be unaffordable for
the world’s poor, condemning them to suffer from curable illnesses. These
voices grew louder during the HIV/AIDS global epidemic, when a critical
defect in this framework emerged, with painful consequences.28
Prior to TRIPS, developing countries would procure unavailable or
unaffordable patented pharmaceuticals from jurisdictions in which they were
abundantly and cheaply available either because they were subject to a CL,
or not patented at all.29 TRIPS abruptly precluded these avenues by rendering
pharmaceutical patents mandatory throughout the WTO and barring the
export of products manufactured under CLs.30 Under this treaty, the only
option for Members seeking to lower prices or increase the supply of a
patented medicine was to issue a CL to a domestic manufacturer, instructing
them to provide the required pharmaceutical. However, if no local producer
possessed the necessary infrastructure and know-how, issuing such a CL
would be futile.31 As TRIPS was gradually implemented across the WTO, it
became evident that the combined effect of its patent and compulsory

20

See infra notes 169-182 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 188-204 and accompanying text.
23
In this Article, the term “Article” refers to the Articles of TRIPS.
24
See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
25
See Amaka Vanni, Lessons from COVID-19 for Medicines Access, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 484 (Srividhya Ragavan & Amaka Vanni eds.,
2021). See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
26
The terms Global South and Global North are used in various ways in social sciences.
In this Articles we use these terms borrowing from Alfred López “What defines the global
South is the recognition by peoples across the planet that globalization’s promised bounties
have not materialized, that it has failed as a global master narrative. The global South also
mark seven celebrates, the mutual recognition among the world’s subalterns of their shared
condition at the margins of the brave new neoliberal world of globalization”; see Alfred J.
López, Introduction: The (Post) Global South, THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1 (2007).
27
See Andreas Rahmatian, Neo-Colonial Aspects of Global Intellectual Property
Protection, 12 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 40 (2009). See infra notes
205-207 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 211 and accompanying text.
30
See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
31
See infra notes 211 and accompanying text.
21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4039264

FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF TRIPS ARTICLE 31BIS



=

licensing regimes was to markedly reduce access to patented medicines for
Members without domestic pharmaceutical production capabilities.32
At the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference of 2001, Members recognized
this issue and agreed that it necessitated an “expeditious solution”.33
Following two years of labored negotiations, Article 31bis was born.34 This
provision engenders a mechanism that, by way of exception to Article 31,
enables a Member with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing
capabilities to import patented medicines supplied by a generics drugs
producer operating under an export compulsory license (ECL) issued by
another Member. At the time of its adoption, lawmakers, non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and commentators welcomed this treaty amendment as
a sorely-needed revision of the TRIPS compulsory licensing framework.35
There were high hopes that ECLs would evolve into powerful tools for
developing countries in their endeavors to deliver adequate access to
medicines for their citizens. Moreover, the collaborative nature of this novel
legal device was praised for forging a solidaristic pathway through which the
Global South might benefit from the know-how and technological
advancements of the Global North.36 Regrettably, this optimism has slowly
faded, as only one ECL has been issued and successfully executed over the
past two decades.
This Article investigates the current fallow state of Article 31bis and
proposes strategies to fulfill its promise. The rationale for this enquiry is
twofold. First, access to medicines continues to be a struggle in many
developing countries. Though great strides have been made in making
pharmaceuticals for HIV/AIDS and other deadly illnesses more readily
available worldwide, patented treatments for cancer, diabetes, hepatitis, and
many other chronic diseases continue to be expensive and hard to access.
Members without developed pharmaceutical production capabilities are
owed an explanation for the continued failure of ECLs.
Second, the SARS-CoV-237 (Covid-19) pandemic has illuminated an
often-overlooked transformation that has unfolded over the past two decades.
Therapeutic biological products (biologics), such as mRNA vaccines,
monoclonal antibodies and chimeric antigen receptor T (CAR-T) cells, have
become the gold standard, if not the only treatment for a growing number of
illnesses.38 The manufacturing capabilities essential to produce biologics are

32

See infra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
34
See infra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
35
See infra notes 220-245 and accompanying text.
36
See infra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
37
See Alexander Gorbalenya et al., The Species Severe Acute Respiratory SyndromeRelated Coronavirus: Classifying 2019-NCoV and Naming It SARS-CoV-2, 5 NATURE
MICROBIOLOGY 536 (2020).
38
The Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (defining a biological product as
“a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative,
allergenic product, protein, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of
33
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fundamentally different from those for conventional chemical drugs.39 Even
among developed countries, very few have adequate production
infrastructure for these types of pharmaceuticals.40 In this context, ECLs
could become a potent weapon to buttress access to biologics internationally,
if they were to operate as originally intended.
This article makes two primary contributions to the existing body of
scholarship on Article 31bis. First, it analyzes the factors that might be
responsible for the underutilization of ECLs and pinpoints those that create
the most substantial obstacles. Diverging from a view held by numerous
scholars, activists and NGOs, we contend that governmental and corporate
interferences, albeit not entirely immaterial, do not currently constitute a
substantial obstacle to the utilization of ECLs under Article 31bis.41 In similar
vein, we refute the widely-propounded notion that domestic laws and free
trade agreements materially hinder recourse to ECLs.42 We posit that the
primary flaws undermining Article 31bis are the complexity of its procedural
dimension and, above all, its inability to offer an economically viable
proposition to generic medicines manufacturers. Regarding the former, we
highlight the onerousness of the mandatory information disclosures
demanded of Members that seek to utilize export compulsory licensing. We
equally criticize the excessive rigidity of the Article 31bis requirements
designed to prevent pharmaceuticals produced under ECLs from being
diverted away from their intended beneficiaries and sold into developed
markets.43 Regarding the latter, we submit that the body of rules under
consideration lumbers prospective pharmaceutical producers with
unnecessary costs, makes it harder for them to achieve economies of scale
and excessively exposes them to litigation risk from patentees.44
As its second contribution, this article proffers actionable interventions to
realize the full potential of ECLs. We advance the view that, under current
law, pooled procurement constitutes the most effective strategy to overcome
the economic challenges undermining ECLs. We highlight that, in
determinate circumstances, Article 31bis(3) allows multiple Members to
aggregate their demand for a patented pharmaceutical and thus afford
interested generics manufacturers a better chance to attain the levels of
production needed for profitability.45 This is followed by an exposition of our
thesis that reform of the current legal framework is required to maximize the
latent opportunities of ECLs. We assess both the merits and viability of a

arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.”).
39
See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
40
See generally Erwin A. Blackstone & P. Fuhr Joseph, The Economics of Biosimilars,
6 AM HEALTH DRUG BENEFITS 469 (2013); Carlos Correa, Will the Amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement Enhance Access to Medicines?, SOUTH CENTRE POLICY BRIEF NO. 57 9 (2019).
41
See infra Part III.A.
42
See infra Part III.B.
43
See infra Part III.C.
44
See infra Part III.D.
45
See infra Part IV.B.
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broad range of alternative interventions. We conclude that radical revisions
either to the entire TRIPS patent regime or Article 31, albeit hypothetically
effective, would be unlikely to ever attract the political support necessary for
their enactment. Instead, we propose targeted amendments aimed at
enhancing the flexibility and economic viability of Article 31bis, submitting
that they would both bolster flows of know-how and patented
pharmaceuticals from the Global North to the Global South and stand a
chance of garnering the necessary political support.46
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, we provide a historical and
comparative primer to the right of access to medicines, patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions and compulsory licensing. This is followed in Part
II by an analysis of the TRIPS patent regime, compulsory licensing under
Article 31, and Article 31bis. Here, we bring into sharp relief the “mischief”47
that export compulsory licensing was designed to redress and dissect the body
of rules enacted for its resolution. In Part III, we investigate the possible
causes of the limited utilization of Article 31bis and present our thesis that
procedural complexities and economic challenges fundamentally undermine
the legal device under consideration. Part IV focuses on approaches to fulfill
the promise of ECLs both within the confines of current law and through law
reform.
I. ACCESS TO MEDICINES, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND
COMPULSORY LICENSING
This Part explores access to medicines, patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions, and compulsory licensing. The aim of this
analysis is threefold. First, to highlight the significant extent to which these
three topics are intertwined. Second, to chart the evolution of this
entanglement over time and across jurisdictions. Third, to expound key
concepts that are foundational for the discourse in Parts II-IV. The issues
under consideration are viewed through historical and comparative lenses to
emphasize the depth and breadth of their roots, and the significance of the
international context.
A. Access to Medicines
Access to medicines comprises a public health dimension and an
individual rights dimension. An understanding of both is required to fully
appreciate the social, legal and economic issues that ensued after the adoption
of the TRIPS patent regime and its compulsory licensing framework.
Collective action to promote the well-being of populations has a long

46

See infra Part IV.C.
47
In legal interpretation, a long-recognized approach is to construe statutory provisions
in light of the “mischief” or “evil” that the law in question was designed to address. See
generally Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. 967 (2021).
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history.48 Ancient Indian, Mayan, and Mycenaean civilizations built
sophisticated sewage networks, water conduits and public baths for
communal use.49 Similarly, illuminated by the teaching of Hippocrates,
Ancient Greek city states appointed public physicians to prevent and cure
illnesses, establishing a custom that would later be embraced by the Persian,
Macedonian and Roman Empires.50
Nevertheless, throughout antiquity, the Middle Ages and the
Enlightenment, public health initiatives focused exclusively on building
infrastructure, preventing contagious illnesses, and palliative care for the sick
and elderly.51 Comparable attention was not devoted to medicines, due to the
relative underdevelopment of pharmacology as science.
It was not until the 18th and 19th centuries that public health policies
started incorporating medicines. Fledgling nation states discovered that
military conquest and industrialization required healthy, growing =
populations.52 In pursuit of these objectives, several European countries and
the United States mandated mass inoculations for smallpox and other
contagious diseases.53 These were the first instances of governments
grappling with the challenges associated with sourcing, distributing, and
administering pharmaceuticals on a large scale.
The 20th century witnessed an unprecedented expansion of public health
initiatives, including the socialization of healthcare.54 In the years preceding
World War I, several countries started introducing social insurance for the
least privileged members of society.55 This solidaristic approach to healthcare
slowly permeated Europe, Japan and the USSR during the 1920s and 1930s,
spreading worldwide after World War II.56 Between the 1950s and 1990s,
most developed and developing countries, with the conspicuous exception of
the United States, established publicly-subsidized systems aiming to provide
“all individuals and communities with the health services they need without

48

On the history of public health see generally Christopher Hamlin, The History and
Development of Public Health in Developed Countries, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 6th ed. 2015); Than Sein, The History and
Development of Public Health in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK
OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 37 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 6th ed. 2015); JOHN TOBIN, THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14–51 (2012); DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH,
CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN
TIMES (1999); GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1958).
49
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 10–23; ROSEN, supra note 48, at 1–5.
50
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 18–23; ROSEN, supra note 48, at 6–26.
51
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 23–45; ROSEN, supra note 48, at 26–100.
52
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 45–61; ROSEN, supra note 48, at 107–66.
53
See Arthur Boylston, The Origins of Inoculation, 105 J. R. SOC. MED. 309 (2012);
ROSEN, supra note 48, at 161–65.
54
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 61–147; TOBIN, supra note 48, at 37–39;
Hamlin, supra note 48; Sein, supra note 48.
55
See generally PORTER, supra note 48, at 96–128 (focusing on Germany, France,
Sweden and England).
56
See generally Hamlin, supra note 48; Sein, supra note 48.
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suffering financial hardship”57 (“universal health coverage”).58 Notably, the
adoption of the universal health coverage model coincided with the meteoric
rise of pharmacology. As governments assumed an expanding role in the
delivery of health care, chemical drugs and biologics became irrevocably
paramount to the treatment of illnesses.59 In this novel scientific environment,
access to medicines was cardinal for the success of the universal healthcare
systems of each country.
During the second half of the 20th century, alongside its mounting
relevance in the public health sphere, access to medicines acquired an ulterior
dimension as an individual right. In international law, it flourished as a
derivative human right, stemming from the rights to life and health.60 The
right to life lies at the heart of every major international human rights
convention,61 and has been deemed jus cogens both by courts and
commentators.62 The prevailing view is that this human right obliges

57

The World Health Organization defines “universal health coverage” as “all
individuals and communities receive the health services they need without suffering financial
hardship. It includes the full spectrum of essential, quality health services, from health
promotion to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care across the life course”;
see https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/universal-health-coverage-(uhc).
58
See generally Rafael Lozano et al., Measuring Universal Health Coverage Based on
an Index of Effective Coverage of Health Services in 204 Countries and Territories, 1990–
2019: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019, 396 THE LANCET
1250 (2020).
59
See generally Hamlin, supra note 48; Sein, supra note 48.
60
See generally Niels Petersen, The Right to Life, International Protection, MAX
PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUB.
INT’L
L.
(June
2019),
available
at
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e841;
HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2008); Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications
as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 325 (2003).
61
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“everyone has the right
to life, liberty and the security of the person”) [hereinafter UDHR]; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
6 I.L.M. 368 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”) [hereinafter ICCPR]; American
Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 (Every person
has the right to have his life respected.).
62
For a judicial example of the right to life being recognized as jus cogens, see Street
Children Case (Morales v. Guatemala), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 63, 139, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecing/seriec_63_ing.doc. See also
Paul W. Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms
of Jus Cogens in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 122 (Bertrand G.
Ramcharan, ed. 1985) (describing the right to life as the “most fundamental human right”);
Karen Parker, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 411, 431–32 (1989) (providing an overview of the right to life as jus cogens).
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53 describes jus cogens “a peremptory
norm of general international law … accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679,
692.
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countries not merely to abstain from depriving people of their life arbitrarily,
but also to actively take steps to enable individuals to survive and live with
dignity.63 From this premise, the conclusion that the right to life includes a
right to access life-saving medicines followed syllogistically, as soon as
pharmaceuticals became essential to survive illnesses. For example, the
Human Rights Committee that monitors the enforcement of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights64 has implied that the right to life
enshrined in Article 6(1) of this treaty encompasses access to life-saving
medical treatments.65 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights admitted a case in which the petitioners argued that El Salvador’s
refusal to purchase essential HIV/AIDS medicines had violated their right to
life under Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights.66
The international human right to health has provided an even stronger
platform for the development of access to medicines as a derivative human
right.67 Numerous international law instruments expressly recognize a right
to health.68 Mirroring the interpretive trajectory of the right to life, the right
to health has been construed ever more broadly to include access to all forms
of treatments, including medicines.69 For example, Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that
individuals have a right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health” and requires signatory countries to take the necessary steps
for “the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic … and other

63

See HESTERMEYER, supra note 60, at 116–17; Yamin, supra note 60, at 330–32;
BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–33 (1985).
Contra see Frank Przetacznik, The Right of Living as a Basic Human Right, 6 SRI LANKA J.
INT’L L. 203, 586-587,603 (1994) (arguing in favor of a narrow interpretation of the right to
life).
64
See supra note 61.
65
See The Right to Life, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at Gen. Comment No. 6, §§ 1-5, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982); See also Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, TT 13, 15, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.72 (1996). See HESTERMEYER, supra note 60, at 116–17; Yamin, supra
note 60, at 331–32.
66
See Odir Miranda v. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Report No. 29/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Annual Report 2000, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, Doc. 20 Rev. (2001), available at
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/29-01.html.
67
The body of scholarship expounding the human right has grown mightily over the past
decade; see generally TOBIN, supra note 48; HESTERMEYER, supra note 60, at 83–84.
68
For example, see UDHR, supra note 61, art. 25 (“Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including …
medical care”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (adopted Dec. 16, 1966) art. 12 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: … The prevention, treatment and
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases”) [hereinafter ICESCR]. For
an exhaustive list see HESTERMEYER, supra note 60, at 83.
69
See Yamin, supra note 60, at 336–41 (providing an exhaustive analysis of this
trajectory).
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diseases”.70 In providing the authoritative interpretation of this provision, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, expressly specified that
it includes a right to access “essential drugs”71 of appropriate quality, in
sufficient quantities, and without discrimination.72
Both bolstering and resonating with these international law
developments, during the second half of the past century, access to medicines
was increasingly recognized as an individual right in domestic laws. The
national constitutions and primary legislations of many countries have
gradually incorporated individual rights to health and healthcare that include
access to pharmaceuticals required for a dignified standard of living.73
Moreover, these rights are often directly justiciable, with individuals entitled
to take legal action against their governments if they fail to adequately cater
to their health needs, including when they are denied medicines.74
Thus, over the course of the 20th century, public health and human rights
laws increasingly demanded that countries ensure access to medicines for
their citizens. The approval, procurement, distribution, and affordability of
pharmaceuticals inexorably became fundamental priorities of national
governments. In the years preceding the negotiations that resulted in the birth
of WTO and TRIPS, this issue was felt with mounting acuity in developing
countries, bringing unprecedented attention to the patent protection of
pharmaceuticals, and CLs.
B. Patents and Pharmaceutical Inventions
Patent law grants a person a time-limited, exclusive right to exploit
economically a technical invention within a determinate territory, in return
for a complete disclosure of its inner workings.75 Throughout history, diverse


70

ICESCR, supra note 68, art 12.2(c).
71
General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 20th Sess., 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000)
[hereinafter General Comment 14]. The ESCR Committee defined the notion “essential
drug” by referring to the WHO List of Essential Drugs. This list is updated regularly by the
WHO.
The
current
version
is
available
at
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/325771/WHO-MVP-EMP-IAU-2019.06eng.pdf.
72
General Comment 14, supra note 71, para 12.
73
See generally Courtney Jung et al., Economic and Social Rights in National
Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043 (2014); Jody Heymann et al., Constitutional Rights
to Health, Public Health and Medical Care: The Status of Health Protections in 191
Countries, 8 GLOB PUBLIC HEALTH 639.
74
See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Legal Determinants of Health:
Harnessing the Power of Law for Global Health and Sustainable Development, 393 THE
LANCET 1857 (2019); ALICIA ELY YAMIN & SIRI GLOPPEN, LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS:
CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (2011).
75
See generally PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2020 VOL. I PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS: VOL I
PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS, ch. III.
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normative justifications have been offered as the basis of patent protection.76
At present, lawmakers and courts worldwide have predominantly embraced
the utilitarian view that the purpose of this branch of commercial law is to
incentivize research, development and marketing of inventions for their
economic and societal welfare benefits.77
The birth of modern patents is typically linked to the English Statute of
Monopolies of 1623.78 This law sparked the evolution of patents from
arbitrarily-awarded sovereign privileges to statutory property rights
conferred pursuant to a regulated, administrative process.79 The patent
custom travelled across the Atlantic80 and bloomed upon the branches of the
first federal US Patent Act of 1790, shortly after the ratification of the
Constitution.81 Most European countries, as well as Russia and Japan,
followed suit, creating their own patent regimes in the following century.82
Though these laws were not entirely homogenous, their policy aims and key
tenets were aligned.83
During the 19th century, the growth of transnational trade prompted
inventors increasingly to seek patent protection in multiple jurisdictions.
Such attempts were often unsuccessful due to substantive and procedural

76

See Giuliano G. Castellano & Andrea Tosato, Commercial Law Intersections, 72
HASTINGS L.J. 999, 1040–41 (2021) (describing the different normative bases that have been
suggested by legal scholars for the patent system).
77
See generally David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously:
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 181–84 (2009);
Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 993–94 (1997).
78
Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Jal/21/3/contents. See Chris Dent, “Generally
Inconvenient”: The 1624 Statute of Monopolies as Political Compromise., 33 MELBOURNE
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 415 (2009).
79
For an analysis of this transformation across jurisdictions see generally Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1),
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697 (1994); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early
Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 849 (1994); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771 (1995).
80
Under English law, North American Colonies were classified as non-English holdings
of the Crown and not parts of the kingdom. The Crown alone dictated the laws applicable to
these overseas territories; statutes of Parliament and English common law did not extend to
them de jure. For an analysis of the influence of English law on the American patents system
see generally Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944).
81
See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the
Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 445 (1997).
82
See generally Zorina B. Khan, Study Paper 1a Intellectual Property and Economic
Development: Lessons from American and European History, LONDON: COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 9 (2002);
83
This picture emerges lucidly from a variety of studies into the historical trajectory
patent law; see generally 1 STEPHEN PERICLES LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 19–27 (1975); SAM
RICKETSON, THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: A
COMMENTARY ¶ 1.17 (2015).
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obstacles, as well as outright discrimination against foreigners.84 To curtail
this international fragmentation, governments endeavored to negotiate a
multilateral treaty that would harmonize the granting of patents across
jurisdictions. These efforts yielded the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property of 1883 (Paris Convention).85
The Paris Convention simplified and standardized the process for
obtaining patents across borders by introducing the principle of national
treatment,86 and the right of priority.87 However, this treaty did not
meaningfully harmonize substantive patent law. Despite holding numerous
revision conferences throughout the 20th century,88 signatory countries were
never able to bridge their differences on key issues, such as which types of
inventions should be patentable, the requirements they should satisfy for
protection, the breadth of the rights awarded to patentees, the duration of the
protection term, and the type of remedies available for infringement.89 It
should be noted that the Paris Convention did not require its signatories to
grant patents for medical inventions, nor did it harmonize compulsory
licensing.90
Absent mandatory international standards, countries maintained
heterogenous rules on patentable subject matter throughout the 20th century.
This disharmony was especially noticeable in the ambit of medical
inventions.91 The United States had a longstanding tradition of granting

84

See generally RICKETSON, supra note 83, ch. II–III.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T.
2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
86
This principle provides that nationals of a Paris Union country are entitled to be
treated, in other countries of the Paris Union, in the same way as those countries treat their
own nationals. See generally RICKETSON, supra note 83, ¶ 9.16-9.65.
87
Typically, national patent systems provide that a patent can be granted only if the
invention in question is not already in the public domain. The Paris Convention, art 4
provides that “any person who has duly filed an application for a patent … in one of the
countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the
other countries, a right of priority” for a period of 12 months from the date of filing of the
first application. See generally Id. ¶ 10.01-10.138.
88
Following the original Paris Convention of 1883, signatory countries agreed to
convene periodic meetings to further harmonize industrial property law. These revision
conferences were held in Rome (1886), Madrid (1890), Brussels (1897-1900), Washington
(1911), the Hague (1925), London (1934), Lisbon (1934) and Stockholm (1967). See Id. ¶
4.01-4.25, 10.46-10.48 (providing an exhaustive analysis of the this revision conference).
89
See generally Id. ¶ 9.01-9.65; see also Andrea Tosato, Secured Transactions and IP
Licenses: Comparative Observations and Reform Suggestions Secured Transactions Law in
the Twenty-First Century, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (2018) (highlighting the
divergences across jurisdiction in the use of IP licenses as collateral).
90
See Paris Convention, supra note 85, art. 5A (“Each country of the Union shall have
the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by
the patent, for example, failure to work.”).
91
See generally GRAHAM DUTFIELD, THAT HIGH DESIGN OF PUREST GOLD: A CRITICAL
HISTORY OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 1880-2020, ch. 9 (2020) (for an exhaustive
85
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patents both for pharmaceutical products and processes.92 In addition,
patentees’ rights were further reinforced by the fact that federal law only
provided for the issuance of CLs to remedy antitrust violations and for
governmental use.93 Western European countries, Japan and Canada
similarly offered patent protection for medical inventions, albeit with lesser
intensity.94 For example, France, Canada, and the United Kingdom enacted
both process and product patents for pharmaceuticals, yet subjected them to
compulsory licensing mechanisms that diluted the exclusive rights of
patentees by enabling generics manufacturers to develop competing
products.95
Taking a different approach, a broad and diverse group of countries,
including Argentina, Austria, Egypt, Greece, India, Spain, and Turkey, only
granted patents for pharmaceutical manufacturing processes.96 In these
jurisdictions, inventors could obtain protection for techniques used to

historical account of the role of IP law in biomedicine); Jean-Paul Gaudillière, How
Pharmaceuticals Became Patentable: The Production and Appropriation of Drugs in the
Twentieth Century, 24 HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY 99 (2008).
92
See generally Graham Dutfield, The Pharmaceutical Industry, the Evolution of Patent
Law and the Public Interest: A Brief History, in EMERGING ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 109, 122–24, 135–46 (Guido Westkamp ed., 2007) (providing an extensive
historical account of pharmaceutical entrepreneurship and pharmaceutical patents in the
United States).
93
On the history of compulsory licensing in the United States, see infra Part I.B.
94
See generally Dutfield, supra note 92, at 147–49 (documenting the history of the
United Kingdom and European continental countries); Joel Lexchin, Pharmaceuticals,
Patents, and Politics: Canada and Bill C-22, 23 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH
SERVICES 147 (1993) (detailing Canada’s legislative trajectory); Akihiko Kawaura &
Sumner J. La Croix, Japan’s Shift from Process to Product Patents in the Pharmaceutical
Industry an Event Study of the Impact on Japanese Firms, 33 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 88 (1995)
(expounding Japan’s legislation on pharmaceutical inventions).
95
See generally Maurice Cassier, Brevets pharmaceutiques et santé publique en France:
Oppositions et dispositifs spécifiques d’appropriation du medicament entre 1791 et 2004,
ENTREPRISE ET HISTOIRE 29–47 (2004) (detailing the history of pharmaceutical patents in
France and its compulsory licensing regime); John M. Wechkin, Drug Price Regulation and
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents: The New Zealand Connection, 5 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 237 (1995) (describing the history of New Zealand patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and the associated compulsory licensing regime); See Judy Slinn, Patents
and the UK Pharmaceutical Industry between 1945 and the 1970s, 24 HISTORY AND
TECHNOLOGY 191 (2008) (charting the history of UK legislation on pharmaceutical patents
and the associated compulsory licensing regime); Lexchin, supra note 94 (detailing the
history of the Canadian compulsory licensing regime for pharmaceuticals).
96
For a complete survey see D. C. Jayasuriya, Pharmaceuticals: Patents and the Third
World, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1988) (detailing that, as of 1988, 49 countries did not grant
patents for pharmaceutical products, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Congo,
Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, Syria and Thailand); Hernan L.
Bentolila, Lessons from the United States Trade Policies to Convert a Pirate: The Case of
Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 57 (2002) (charting the history
of Argentinian protection for pharmaceutical inventions before and after TRIPS); See
Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
273, 278–90 (2006) (providing a detailed account of Indian patent law and its policy choice
to grant only process patents for medicines).
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synthesize medicines, but not for the product itself. Competitors could freely
produce and sell the same pharmaceutical, provided they obtained it through
an alternative manufacturing process. Still differently, a small group of
countries, including Brazil and Ecuador, completely excluded patentability
of pharmaceutical inventions regardless of whether they involved a product
or a process.97
The heterogeneity that characterized the protection of pharmaceutical
inventions internationally during the 20th century was not a fortuitous
accident of history. Across jurisdictions, lawmakers faced the same challenge
of achieving equilibrium between providing access to medicines in adequate
quantities and affordable prices to their citizens and stimulating research and
development while rewarding pharmaceutical inventors. However, they
arrived at profoundly different solutions, as each country took a different
view on what constituted a palatable balance, based on their legal, economic,
social and political milieu. There was no single recipe suitable for every
jurisdiction.
Crucially, this landscape swiftly evolved during the 1980s. Through
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral initiatives, the United States and other
countries with established pharmaceutical industries mounted a relentless
campaign to enhance patent protection for medical inventions worldwide.
Canada, Japan and most Western European countries expanded the
patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes, while narrowing the
breadth of their compulsory licensing systems.98 Over the span of eight short
years (1985-1993), China pivoted from offering no protection for medical
inventions to granting both product and process patents.99 Following the
dissolution of the USSR, Russia and many Eastern European countries
enacted patent regimes that provided ample protection to pharmaceutical
inventions.100

97

See generally Kumariah Balasubramaniam, Pharmaceutical Patents in Developing
Countries: Policy Options, 22 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (1987) (providing a
broad overview the laws of developing countries that did not protect pharmaceutical
inventions); Carolyn S. Corn, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is Compulsory Licensing
the Solution Note, 9 B.U. INT’L L. J. 71 (1991) (documenting Brazil’s pharmaceutical patents
stance). It should be noted that Mexico also granted neither process nor product patents on
pharmaceutical inventions, until 1991; see generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of
Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases of Health Policies, 42
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 41 (2009).
98
See generally Lexchin, supra note 94 (charting the history of patent protection for
pharmaceutical inventions in Canada); Kawaura & Croix, supra note 94 (for a
comprehensive analysis of Japan’s implementation of product patents for pharmaceutical
inventions); BENGT DOMEIJ, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN EUROPE (2000).
99
See generally Xuan Li, The Impact of Higher Standards in Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical Industries under the TRIPS Agreement – A Comparative Study of China and
India, 31 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1367 (2008) (detailing this swift evolution under Chinese
law).
100
See generally Elizabeth F. Enayati, Patent Protection for Biotechnology Inventions
in Eastern Europe, BIO/TECHNOLOGY No. 2, 191 (1994) (detailing the adoption of patent
protection for pharmaceutical inventions in Eastern European countries).
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Developing countries reacted diversely to political and economic
pressures urging them to introduce patent protection for medical process and
patent inventions.101 A few, including Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, and
Turkey ultimately conceded, in return for preferential regional and
international trade links.102 Most developing countries in Africa, Asia and
Latin America, including India and Brazil, resisted such pressures. Their
position was that it was their sovereign right not to implement pharmaceutical
patents both to foster their domestic biomedical sector and facilitate access to
medicines.103
By the time TRIPS negotiations commenced, patent protection for
medical inventions had become a highly contentious matter in international
relations, further compounded by the compulsory licensing disputes that
emerged in the context of the Paris Convention.
C. Compulsory Licensing
CLs have a rich history. A primordial form of compulsory licensing for
public use can be traced back the Venetian General Patent Law (Parte
Veneziana) of 1474.104 Under this law, the Venetian government could “take
and use any [patented] device and instrument, with this condition however
that no one but the author shall operate it”.105 Although innovative, the
Venetian law never penetrated the borders of other jurisdictions and
eventually faded into obscurity, in lockstep with the Serenissima’s economic
and military decline.
Three centuries later, another embryonic compulsory licensing scheme
surfaced in the South Carolinian Act for the Encouragement of Arts and
Sciences of 1784.106 This law established a common regime for copyrights

101
See generally Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharmaceutical
Industry: A Survey of the Patent Laws of Various Countries, 30 THE INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER 835 (1996) (describing the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions spearheaded
by the United States); Julio J. Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding
the Pressures on Developing Countries, World Bank Working Paper Series No. 502, 3–10
(1990).
102
See generally Lewis, supra note 101 (charting the shift in the legislation of these
countries); Shadlen, supra note 97 (explaining that Mexico chose to introduce patent
protection for pharmaceuticals to enhance its trading partnership with the United States and
Canada).
103
See generally also PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION
FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY?, ch. 9 (202); Verena Schüren, Two
TRIPs to Innovation: Pharmaceutical Innovation Systems in India and Brazil, SFBGOVERNANCE WORKING PAPER SERIES, NO. 37 (2012) (for a detailed analysis of India and
Brazil).
104
This Venetian law is considered to be the first patent statute in history. See Stefania
Fusco, Lessons from the Past: The Venetian Republic’s Tailoring of Patent Protection to the
Characteristics of the Invention, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 301 (2019); Giulio
Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378 (1960).
105
See Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 176–
77 (1948) (analyzing the history of this Venetian Patent Law)
106
See South Carolina Statutes at Large (Cooper Edition, 1839), Vol. IV, 618-20.
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and patents.107 Accordingly, patentees were subject to a provision
establishing that if a copyright holder “neglected to furnish the public with
sufficient editions [of the protected work], or shall sell the same at a price
unreasonable” a person could petition a court to obtain a “license to reprint
and publish such [work], in such numbers, and for such term, as said court
shall judge just and reasonable”.108 While the Venetian compulsory licensing
system permitted government use, the South Carolinian law provided for the
first implementation of court-sanctioned CLs between private persons.109 Be
that as it may, the South Carolinian Act of 1784 never bore fruit, as it was
swiftly superseded by the Federal Patent Act of 1790. It should be noted that
lawmakers drafting this federal statute consciously chose not to introduce
CLs. Presented with a Senate amendment proposing a compulsory licensing
regime modeled after that in the South Carolinian Act of 1784, the House of
Representatives soundly rejected it, following a debate in which CLs were
criticized as an intolerable encroachment on patentees’ rights.110
Venetian and South Carolinian antecedents notwithstanding, the first
fully-fledged compulsory licensing regime was enacted in the English
Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act of 1883 (Patents Act of 1883).111
Under Section 22 of this law, a persons could petition the Board of Trade to
obtain a CL over a patent if the invention in question was not being “worked”
in England, or if the “reasonable requirements” of the public were not being
supplied, or if the petitioner were trying to exploit an invention derivative of
the patented one and was being prevented from doing so due the patentees
unwillingness to grant a voluntary license. Providing a fourth ground for
compulsory licensing, Section 27(2) established that the government could
use a patented invention “for the services of the Crown” on terms determined
by the Treasury.112 This compulsory licensing framework had a long-lasting

107

See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 119
(1967) (analyzing of this statute and noting that was largely inspired by the Connecticut
Copyright Statute of 1783).
108
See Id. at 119–20.
109
See Francine Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes Part I, 23 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 11, 35 (1975) (analyzing the applicable procedural rules and
noting that the choice of South Carolinian 1784 Act to extend the rules for copyright to
patents engendered numerous difficulties).
110
See William Maclay's journal entry of April 5, 1790, reprinted in 22 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 352 (1940) at 371; BUGBEE, supra note 107, at 143. See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld,
Compulsory Licenses and United States Industrial and Artistic Property Law, 47 CALIF. L.
REV. 51 (1959) (charting the history of compulsory licenses in United States intellectual
property federal statues).
111
On the historical origin of compulsory licensing see generally David J. Brennan, The
First Compulsory Licensing of Patents and Copyright, 17 LEGAL HISTORY 1 (2017)
(focusing on Anglo-American law); Oliver Brand, The Dawn of Compulsory Patent
Licensing, 11 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY QUARTERLY 216 (2007) (for an exhaustive analysis
of compulsory licensing from the Parte Veneziana to the English patent law reform of 1883);
James Roberts, Compulsory Licences to Work Patented Inventions, 6 JOURNAL OF THE
SOCIETY OF COMPARATIVE LEGISLATION 82 (1905) (for comparative insights).
112
See The Patents Act of 1883, s. 27(2). Under this statute, for the first time, English
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impact in the United Kingdom113 and served as a blueprint for many common
law,114 and civil law jurisdictions.115
During the 20th century, numerous countries incorporated domestic
compulsory licensing mechanisms in their patent laws.116 These regimes
diverged significantly. In some jurisdictions, CLs could only be granted on
narrow grounds, primarily to redress anti-competitive practices, failure to
work, unjustifiably high prices or low production levels. In others, patent
legislation liberally provided for the issuance of CLs on broad grounds,
including public health, national defense, technology transfers, and
environmental protection.117 There were also marked dissimilarities
regarding the scope, breadth, and duration of CLs and whether affected
patentees were entitled to compensation.118 These differences reflected
divergent normative aims. In some jurisdictions, CLs were proffered as
exceptional remedies to redress patentees’ abuses, whereas in others they
were viewed as instruments to loosen patent protection, in active pursuit of
public policy aims.119 Conspicuously, several countries liberally subjected
pharmaceutical patents to CLs with the aim of increasing access to medicines
for their citizens.120
This dissonance amongst national compulsory licensing regimes
eventually became a contentious international matter, as evidenced by the
history of the Paris Convention. In the original treaty of 1883, CLs were not
even mentioned.121 In the revisions that took place up to 1958,122 signatory
countries agreed without incident that compulsory licensing should be
implemented as the default remedy to tackle patentees’ abuses, such as

patentees could enforce their exclusive rights against the Crown, albeit subject to the
compulsory licensing mechanism in section 27(2). See Brennan, supra note 111, at 5–6
(analyzing section 27 of the Patents Act of 1883).
113
The current British compulsory licensing regime largely replicates that of the Patents
Act of 1883. See The Patents Act 1977, c. 37, §§ 48A, 48B, 49-54 (Eng.). See RICHARD
MILLER ET AL., TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS, ch. 17 (19th ed. 2021).
114
For example, the Singaporean Patents Act (Singapore, cap 221, 2005 rev ed) § 55
and Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cth) §§ 133, 135 echoes the provisions of the British
Patents Act of 1883.
115
See generally Jarrod Tudor, Compulsory Licensing in the European Union, 4 GEO.
MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 222 (2012).
116
See Jerome H. Reichman, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions:
Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in
Canada and the United States of America 10–12 (International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development 2003); 1 LADAS, supra note 83, at 533–35.
117
See Reichman, supra note 116, at 10–12; LADAS, supra note 83, at 533–35.
118
See Reichman, supra note 116, at 10–12; LADAS, supra note 83, at 533–35.
119
See LADAS, supra note 83, at 533–34 (providing a comparative analysis of
compulsory licensing regimes in force between the 1960s and 1975); see Reichman, supra
note 116, at 11 (providing a historical and comparative analysis).
120
See supra Part I.A.
121
See LADAS, supra note 83, at 522–27 (charting the history of the provisions of the
Paris Convention dealing with compulsory licensing).
122
Specifically, the Rome (1886), Madrid (1890), Brussels (1897-1900), Washington
(1911), the Hague (1925), and London 1934 revision conferences. See supra note 81.
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“failure to work”, whereas outright revocations should only be a measure of
last recourse.123 It was at the Lisbon Revision Conference of 1958 that, for
the first time, divergent national attitudes to compulsory licensing truly came
to the fore.124 Negotiators discussed whether the Paris Convention should
limit the grounds upon which signatory parties could grant CLs, and
introduce mandatory procedural and substantive standards.125 Following
fraught negotiations, a consensus could not be found. A narrow accord was
reached for CLs issued to redress “failure to work or insufficient working”.126
By contrast, signatory parties retained unfettered discretion for CLs granted
on grounds of public interest or to redress abuses other than non-working.127
Following the Lisbon Revision Conference, the international community
grew increasingly divided in its views on patents and compulsory
licensing.128 These divergences emerged starkly during the failed Paris
Convention revision process of 1980-1984. Seeking easier access to patented
inventions, developing countries wanted greater freedom to attenuate
patentees’ exclusive rights.129 To this end, they proposed that the Paris
Convention should explicitly encourage liberal recourse to CLs on grounds
of public interest, and the possibility for countries to issue exclusive CLs that
would bar the affected patentees from competing with compulsory
licensees.130 Conversely, developed countries pressed for elevating patent
protection standards mandated by the Paris Convention.131 Regarding CLs,
they posited that these instruments were being abused in many jurisdictions
to the detriment of foreign patentees. To rectify this mischief, they proposed

123

See generally Reichman, supra note 116, at 11; RICKETSON, supra note 83, ¶ 10.50.
This was the seventh revision convention. See supra note 88.
125
For example, this was the first revisions convention in which it was considered
whether patentees subject to a compulsory license should be entitled to monetary
compensation. See RICKETSON, supra note 83, ¶ 10.51; LADAS, supra note 83, at 534–36.
126
See Paris Convention Article 5A(4) (Lisbon Revision Conference) “available at
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/287778; See RICKETSON, supra note 83, ¶ 10.51 (providing
an extensive commentary of this provisions and the Lisbon Revision Conference more
broadly).
127
See Reichman, supra note 116 (emphasizing that “the conditions governing the
issuance of compulsory licenses on general grounds of abuse were liberalized and
harmonized with the more permissive rules (or lack of rules) governing compulsory licenses
issued on public interest grounds.”).
128
This growing chasm is lucidly visible in the informal meetings that were organized
by WIPO to promote the revision of the Paris Convention. See WIPO, General Report
adopted by WIPO Coordination Committee, the Paris Union Executive Committee and the
Berne Executive Committee, Administrative Bodies of WIPO and of the Unions
Administered by WIPO, WIPO Document AB/V/13, 30 September 1974, Fifth Series of
Meetings, Geneva, September 24–30, 1974.
129
These proposals were put forward by the “Group of 77” which included (all of Africa,
except for South Africa, South America, the Caribbean, and Asia, except for Japan). See
RICKETSON, supra note 83, ¶ 5.05 (explaining the history of the different state groupings).
130
See Id. ¶ 5.09-5.11, 10.59-10.63 (describing the proposals presented at the Nairobi
(1981) and Geneva (1982, 1984, 1985) Revision Conferences).
131
These proposals were put forward by “Group B” which comprised the countries of
Europe (except for those in the Warsaw Pact) Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and
the USA. See Id. ¶ 5.05.
124
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breadth and scope limitations for CLs, narrower grounds for issuance, and
mandatory compensation for patentees.132
After four years of openly contentious and inconclusive negotiations,
countries abandoned all aspirations for a substantive revision of the Paris
Convention. Developing and developed countries had reached complete
deadlock. Notably, compulsory licensing generally, and CLs for
pharmaceutical patents in particular, were flashpoints in this principled
disagreement.
II. TRIPS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
Part I described how different jurisdictions assumed diverging
approaches to the intricate entanglement of access to medicine,
pharmaceutical patents and compulsory licensing. Furthermore, it explained
that this heterogeneity caused tension and, ultimately, a stalemate between
developed and developing countries by the early 1990s. This impasse was
conclusively resolved with the creation of the WTO and the concurrent
adoption of TRIPS. This Part expounds this momentous development,
describing first the WTO negotiating history and then delving into TRIPS
patent rules for medical inventions and compulsory licensing. The aim of this
analysis is to explore exhaustively the path that led to the enactment of Article
31bis, bringing into sharp relief both the grave defect which this provision
was designed to resolve and its manner of operation.
A. From the General Agreement on Tariffs to the World Trade
Organization
The WTO is the offspring of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
of 1947 (GATT).133 Enacted at the end of World War II, GATT was designed
to bolster cross-border commerce among formerly belligerent nations.134
Over the subsequent four decades, this international trade agreement
blossomed, as countries regularly engaged in rounds of negotiations to
broaden its remit.135 From its inception, GATT was centered on tangible
goods, with IP issues only being considered at the margins.136 This changed

132

See Id. ¶ 5.09-5.11, 10.59-10.63.
133
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
134
See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 5–97 (2008)
(for a history of the creation of the GATT); DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS ¶ 1.02 (5th ed. 2021).
135
See GIUSEPPE LA BARCA, THE US, THE EC AND WORLD TRADE: FROM THE KENNEDY
ROUND TO THE START OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (2016) (analyzing all the GATT negotiating
rounds that preceded the Uruguay Round).
136
The GATT addressed IP law issues tangentially, by recognizing that trade restrictions
flowing from the application of domestic IPRs regimes – such as blocking imports of goods
deemed to be infringing of a patent right – were admissible and lawful. See DANIEL J.
GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 1.05-1.07.
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drastically in the round of negotiations held in Uruguay between 1986-1994
(Uruguay Round).137
During the Uruguay Round, countries committed to an ambitious
overhaul of the extant GATT framework. It was decided to cover a wide
range of trade areas by drafting multiple, parallel treaties that would be
developed individually but signed as a single package. Performing a sharp
“regime-shifting” maneuver,138 a group of developed countries, led by the
United States and the European Economic Community, advocated for the
inclusion of a treaty on “trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights”.139
It was initially agreed that such project should have a narrow scope, only
addressing cross-border trade in counterfeit goods. Nevertheless, a
“coalition”140 of developed countries insisted on expanding this agenda
significantly. Despite remonstrations from developing countries,141 at the
Uruguay midterm review of 1989, it was decided that the IP treaty under
development would articulate minimum protection standards for copyright,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
topographies of integrated circuits and trade secrets, which signatory
countries would be required to implement domestically.142
This expanded scope required far broader negotiations. The treatment of
medical inventions and CLs immediately emerged as profoundly problematic
issues in the patents sphere, heralding the resumption of a long-standing
international debate.143 Developing countries advocated for the complete or

137

The Uruguay Round was the eighth round of GATT negotiations. See generally Id. ¶
1.12-1.29 (providing a detailed analysis of the Uruguay Round negotiations); Charles Clift,
Why IPR Issues Were Brought to GATT: A Historical Perspective on the Origins of TRIPS,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO
RULES 3, 10–20 (Carlos Correa ed., 2010).
138
See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (defining
“regime shifting” as "an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations,
lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international venue to another);
James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Lawmaking and Enforcement from the
WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 427 (2017) (who
build on the Helfer’s definition and present it as “improving power dynamics by shifting
from one regime with a view to directly or indirectly create alternative law or practices that
conflict with those in another regime”).
139
See Clift, supra note 137 (for a detailed history of the negotiations that led to the
inclusion of IP issues within the scope of the nascent WTO).
140
See Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal
Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 483, 485–90 (2007) (for a history of country coalitions in the
GATT and WTO).
141
See generally Clift, supra note 137, at 15; JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27–28 (2001) (describing
these negotiations from the perspective of the Indian delegation).
142
The Uruguay Round midterm meetings were held in Montreal (December 5-8, 1988)
and continued in Geneva (April 5-8 1989). See WATAL, supra note 141, at 27–28 (providing
an overview of this meeting and suggesting that developing countries surrendered too much
to the demands of developed countries).
143
See supra Parts I.B-C.
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partial exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentable subject matter, as well
as absolute freedom for countries to issue compulsory licenses with minimal
or little compensation for patent holders.144 Conversely, developed countries
insisted that medical inventions should be protectable with both product and
process patents; moreover, they contended that compulsory licensing should
only be permissible in a narrow set of circumstances, subject to judicial
review and with adequate compensation for patent holders.145
This polarization was never fully overcome. After contentious
negotiations and numerous drafts, the text presented for final approval largely
reflected the stance of developed countries.146 It required signatories to
introduce full patentability for both pharmaceutical products and
processes.147 Regarding compulsory licensing, it provided that each country
could freely determine the grounds upon which they granted CLs, yet it
imposed mandatory procedural and substantive safeguards for affected patent
holders.148 Ultimately faced with a “take it or leave it” proposition,
developing countries begrudgingly accepted that internationally-harmonized,
mandatory minimum protection standards for IP, including pharmaceutical
patents and CLs, were the price to be paid in return for unconstrained access
to the agricultural and manufacturing markets of developed countries.149
At the Marrakesh Ministerial meeting of 1994, the WTO was born.
Protection of IP pursuant to the substantive and procedural standards
established by TRIPS had become one of the cornerstones of the new
international trade legal order.
B. The TRIPS Framework
The TRIPS Preamble begins with the express acknowledgement that both
excessive and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs)

144

For example, see Peru MTN .GNG/NG11/W/45 (27 October 1989) (proposing that
pharmaceutical inventions should be excluded from patentable subject matter and that
countries should have ample discretion in imposing compulsory licenses, including when the
patent is not worked locally, there is insufficient supply, or local exploitation has been
suspended).
145
For example, Canada MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47 (25 October 1989) (pharmaceutical
patents for both products and process inventions; compulsory licensing subject formulated
as non-exclusive, subject to judicial review, linked to adequate compensation and governed
by the national treatment principle), Korea MTN.GNG/NG11/W/48 (26 October 1989)
(pharmaceutical patents for both products and process inventions; compulsory licensing
allowed only for national defense or public interest or when the invention has not been
exploited).
146
See MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (23 July 1990). See also DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note
134, ¶ 1.22-1.28 (providing a detailed history of these negotiations).
147
See infra Part II.C.
148
See infra Part II.D.
149
For a contemporary perspective see generally Jerome H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement Symposium: Uruguay Round - GATT/WTO, 29 INT’L L. 345 (1995);
Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 385 (1996).
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distort and impede international trade.150 This is followed by several
paragraphs that, as observed by Daniel Gervais, express the aim of TRIPS to
achieve “a series of equilibriums: between intellectual property protection
and free trade … between highly industrialised and developing nations;
between the private rights of intellectual property owners and cases where
the public interest may trump some aspects of the protection of intellectual
property”.151
TRIPS Part I establishes general provisions and basic principles that
underpin the whole treaty. For present purposes, Articles 7-8 deserve special
attention. The former asserts that IP protection and enforcement “should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology” for the benefit of both right holders and
users “in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations”.152
In similar vein, Article 8 provides that signatory states may adopt
measures for the safeguarding of “public health and nutrition” and promote
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development.153 This provision positively recognizes that Members may
introduce measures to prevent right holders from abusing their IPRs.154
Nevertheless, Article 8 expressly specifies that all such domestic
interventions must be consistent with the provisions of TRIPS.155
Articles 7-8 are declaratory in nature, enshrining key concerns voiced by
developing countries during negotiations, particularly regarding patent
protection of pharmaceuticals and compulsory licensing. These provisions
are significant as they express the legislative intent underlying TRIPS and
thus provide a normative reference point for its interpretation.156
Nevertheless, the significance of Articles 7-8 should not be overstated, as
they can be construed as neither establishing actionable obligations for
Members to discharge,157 nor as creating general exceptions allowing
Members to dilute the mandatory IP protection standards established by
TRIPs.158

150

TRIPS, supra note 18, Preamble. See Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, report
of the Appellate Body, document WT/DS435/AB/R and WT/DS441/AB/R, 9 June 2020, at
para.6.625 and fn.1599 (describing this statement of the Preamble as “key”).
151
See generally DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.13; CARLOS CORREA, TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 1–17 (2d ed. 2020).
152
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 7.
153
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 8(1).
154
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 8(2).
155
Id.
156
See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.117, 3.130 (remarking that these
provisions should be viewed as interpretive tools); CARLOS CORREA, supra note 151, at 83–
107 (who expressly speaks of the "interpretive function" of these provisions).
157
See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.117, 3.130; CARLOS CORREA, supra note
151, at 83–107.
158
See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.117, 3.130; CARLOS CORREA, supra note
151, at 83–107.
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TRIPS Part V includes one the most significant additions of this treaty to
the international IP landscape. Article 64 provides that the GATT “Dispute
Settlement Understanding”159 applies to “the settlement of disputes” arising
among signatory states, concerning the enactment and application of
TRIPS.160 One Member may bring an action before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body for alleged failures of another Member to either implement
or enforce the IP protection standards imposed by TRIPS.161 This
international adjudication mechanism features both soft and formal
compliance instruments and is considerably more robust and incisive than
any enforcement process associated with the other major, multilateral
instruments dealing with substantive IP law.162
Lastly, TRIPS Part VI formulates transitional rules designed to facilitate
signatory states in their progressive implementation of the substantive regime
mandated by this treaty. Under Article 65, developed signatory states were
required to comply with TRIPS within one year of the treaty coming into
force,163 while developing countries were given a five-year time window,
with an additional five years to implement product patents, including for
pharmaceuticals inventions.164 Coextensively, Article 66(1) afforded ten
years to “least-developed country Members”165 (LDC) to comply with all
TRIPS obligations.166 However, this deadline has been postponed repeatedly
over the past three decades,167 and a new extension has recently been granted
until 2034.168 Article 66(1) embodies the principles expressed in Articles 78, by providing jurisdictions in the early stages of their industrial and

159

See Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). See generally WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Sep.
2017) [hereinafter WTO DSU Handbook].
160
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 64.
161
See generally WTO DSU Handbook, supra note 159, at 40-47.
162
See generally DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.773-3.777; see also MATTHEW
KENNEDY, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 40–106 (2016) (for an
analysis of the TRIPS compliance instruments).
163
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 65(1).
164
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 65(2)-(4).
165
In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a list of “least developed
among the developing countries” as a special group of developing countries characterized by
a low level of income and structural impediments to growth and requiring special measures
for dealing with those problems. This list has been updated annually and currently comprises
46 countries. See UNCTAD, THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY REPORT 2021 (2021),
available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ldc2021_en.pdf; UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON THE LEAST
DEVELOPED COUNTRY CATEGORY: INCLUSION, GRADUATION AND SPECIAL SUPPORT
MEASURES, (United Nations Fund for Population Activities 4th ed. Dec. 2021).
166
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 66(1).
167
See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, at 3.792-3.796 (detailing the history of these
extensions).
168
See WTO, WTO members agree to extend TRIPS transition period for LDCs until 1
July 2034, available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trip_30jun21_e.htm.
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technological development with a loose timeline for the gradual
implementation of IP protections.
This provision affords great flexibility to LDCs with regard to
pharmaceutical patents. They can tailor their domestic regime in whatever
way best suits their socio-economic milieu, electing, for example, not to
protect such inventions, or only awarding process patents, or making
patentees’ rights conditional on local investments. Additionally, even if an
LDC chooses to introduce partial or full patent protection for pharmaceutical
innovations, they can later revise, suspend or revoke this recognition, as
Article 66(1) does not forbid signatory states from lowering protection levels.
C. The TRIPS Patent Regime
TRIPS Part II articulates the protection standards that Members are
required to implement in their domestic law for copyright, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, topographies of
integrated circuits and trade secrets. Patents are covered in Articles 27-34.
The fundamental elements of this body of rules can be summarized as
follows. First, signatory states must grant patents for both products and
process inventions “in all fields of technology”.169 Pharmaceutical inventions
are included without exception.170 The only admissible exclusions are for
inventions that are considered harmful to “ordre public or morality”,171 as
well as “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and plants and animals
other than micro-organisms.”172
Second, Article 27 articulates three requirements for an invention to be
patentable: novelty, inventiveness and industrial application.173 In line with
GATT and WTO general principles, discrimination based on the place of
invention or production of the patented item or its field of application is
expressly forbidden.174
Third, the minimum term of patent protection must not be shorter than 20
years for all patents.175
Fourth, signatory states are required to award a bundle of “negative


169

TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27(1).
170
It should be noted that the TRIPS obligation is not absolute. See Cynthia M. Ho,
Should All Drugs Be Patentable: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
295, 323–33 (2015) (examining Canada’s and India’s restrictive approaches to patentability
of pharmaceutical inventions through a narrow interpretation of the utility requirement and
notion of eligible subject matter respectively).
171
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27(2).
172
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27(3)(b).
173
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27(1).
174
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27(1). See WTO Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents,
WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000) 170-171 (distinguishing between “differentiation” and
“discrimination” and specifying that “Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exceptions to
deal with problems that may exist only in certain product areas.”).
175
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 33.
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rights”176 to patentees that must include the rights to exclude others from
making, using, selling or importing the protected invention (product
patents)177 or products obtained through the protected process (process
patents).178 Moreover, signatory countries must allow both the transfer and
licensing of these exclusive rights, though no minimum standards are
imposed regarding the form and substance of these transactions.179
The TRIPS protection standards for patents are both substantively higher
and less flexible than those enshrined in the Paris Convention.180 This is
especially noticeable regarding the regime applicable to pharmaceutical
inventions. The requirement that Members implement both product and
process patents in this field of technology stands out as especially disruptive
when considering the nuanced landscape which existed prior to the birth of
the WTO.181 Nevertheless, TRIPS also includes “flexibilities” that were
incorporated expressly to enable Members to craft bespoke patent regimes
for their domestic realities.182
Pursuant to Article 30, signatory states may forge generally-applicable
“exceptions”183 to curtail the exclusive rights conferred by patents, as long as
they are “limited”, and neither “unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent”, nor “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties”.184 Albeit subject to these three requirements, TRIPS does not impose
substantive or procedural restrictions on Members, leaving them discretion
to introduce any exceptions they deem appropriate. For example, under
Article 30, laws may be enacted that permit the otherwise-infringing use of
patented inventions for research and experimental purposes (e.g. clinical
trials and similar activities that involve a patented invention), private noncommercial reasons, early working, stockpiling, parallel importation (first
sale doctrine), and preparation of medicines for personal consumption.185
Beyond Article 30, TRIPS affords additional flexibility to Members

176

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a negative right as “A right entitling a person to have
another refrain from doing an act that might harm the person entitled.”; see GARNER (ED),
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
177
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 28(1)(a).
178
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 28(1)(b).
179
See Andrea Tosato, Intellectual Property License Contracts: Reflections on a
Prospective UNCITRAL Project, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 1251 (2018) (highlighting the absence
of an internationally harmonized framework for the licensing, assignment and use as
collateral of IP licenses).
180
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
181
See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
182
See generally Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of
Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds.,
1996).
183
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 30.
184
Id.
185
See generally ANDREW LAW, PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 93–94 (2009) (for an
exhaustive analysis of all these exceptions).
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regarding interventions that impair the rights of individual patent holders.
Article 32 accepts that Members have the power to revoke determinate
patents, imposing neither substantive nor procedural restrictions on such
forfeitures, but for the requirement that patentees are afforded “an
opportunity for judicial review”.186 TRIPS also squarely recognizes that
Members may issue CLs, yet establishes detailed conditions for the scope and
duration of measures, as well as procedural and substantive safeguards for
patentees.
D. The TRIPS Compulsory Licensing Regime: Article 31
The TRIPS compulsory licensing framework was originally enshrined in
its entirety within Article 31. This provision was the object of lengthy and
difficult negotiations.187 It spawned the first internationally-harmonized
regime for CLs, breaking new ground in an area of patent law that was
previously left almost entirely to the discretion of each country.188 From a
socio-political perspective, this was a momentous development in the
compulsory licensing dispute between developing and developed countries
that had started in the revision conferences of the Paris Convention and
continued throughout the Uruguay Round.189
The key tenets of the Article 31 regime can be summarized as follows.190
First, CLs can only be granted by governmental bodies, although no
restrictions are imposed on their nature, composition or function.191
Second, each application for a CL must be considered “on its individual
merits”.192 This requirement does not preclude Members from enacting laws
that establish presumptions in favor of issuing CLs in determinate
circumstances,193 yet it does exclude “blanket” compulsory licensing.194

186

TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 32. Notably, this provision does not affect the limitations
to patent revocations imposed by the Paris Convention; see 1 LADAS, supra note 83, at 519–
38 (for an exhaustive analysis of the rules on patent forfeitures in the Paris Convention).
187
See supra Part II.A.
188
See supra Part I.C.
189
See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 3.439-3.449 (analyzing the history of this
provision and the different drafts considered by negotiating states throughout the Uruguay
Round).
190
The summary provided here does not touch upon Articles 31(k) and (l) dealing with
the grant of compulsory licenses to remedy “anti-competitive practices”, and to permit the
“the exploitation of a patent … which cannot be exploited without infringing another patent”
respectively. Compulsory licenses granted on these grounds lie outside the scope of the
present enquiry.
191
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31(a).
192
Id.
193
For example, a Member might enact a law establishing that insufficient supply of a
patented product at an affordable price is grounds for the granting of a CL, placing the burden
on patentees to prove otherwise.
194
See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005)
(explaining that governments cannot grant “blanket authorizations of compulsory licences
pertaining to types of technologies or enterprises, but instead should require each application
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Third, the lawful grant of a CL is conditional upon the prospective
licensee having first undertaken “efforts” to obtain a consensual license from
the patentee on “reasonable commercial terms and conditions” and that such
efforts were not “successful within a reasonable period of time”.195 This
negotiation requisite does not apply in “circumstances of extreme urgency”
or for “public non-commercial use”, though the issuing Member must notify
the patent holder of issued CLs without delay.196
Fourth, the government act awarding a CL must specify its scope and
duration and such limitations must legally binding on the licensee.197
Fifth, Members can only issue CLs that are non-exclusive and nonassignable.198
Sixth, Article 31(f) specifies that CLs must be “authorized predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market” of the issuing country. Notably, this
provision does not impose a determinate methodology to quantify such
predominance, allowing Members to choose their own measuring
parameters; nevertheless, the elasticity of the word “predominantly” is not
boundless, making the substance of this restriction unequivocal.199
Seventh, Members must confer an “adequate remuneration” to patent
holders subject to CLs, based on the relevant circumstances and the economic
value of the protected invention.200
Eighth, consistently with the rule of law principle permeating the entirety
of TRIPS,201 Members must ensure that patentees have a right to challenge
judicially both the issuance of a CL and the amount of compensation
received.202
Since its adoption, Article 31 has attracted spirited criticism.
Commentators have averred that it unjustifiably hinders Members’ sovereign
prerogatives to issue CLs to pursue public policy objectives and remedy

for a licence to undergo a process of review to determine whether it meets the established
criteria for the granting of a licence”).
195
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31(b). See generally Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff,
Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical
Patents Symposium: The Licensing of Intellectual Property, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011)
(considering the range of possible meanings attributable to “reasonable commercial terms
and conditions”).
196
Id.
197
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31(c).
198
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31 (d)-(e).
199
See Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs
and beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
(2009) (suggesting that predominance may be measured on the basis of diverse parameters);
Frederick M. Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at
the WTO after the Doha Declaration on Public Health, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
(GENEVA) (QUNO), OCCASIONAL PAPER 9 (2002) (who tentatively suggests that compulsory
licenses under which the domestic market would receive forty percent of the supply, while
three foreign markets each individually received twenty percent of the supply might be
lawful).
200
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31(h).
201
See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 41(4).
202
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31(i)-(j).
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abusive conduct, by entrenching impregnable safeguards for patentees.203 We
disagree.
It is unquestionable that Article 31 establishes mandatory minimum
standards regulating the process for the issuance of CLs, their scope, duration,
distribution and remuneration. However, this regime is built on the premise
that Members may subject any patent, at any moment in time during its
protection term, to a CL, regardless of the nature of the invention and whether
it covers a product or a process, including patents on pharmaceuticals. Article
31 does not curtail the grounds upon which a Member may issue CLs in any
way, nor does it dictate minimum substantive or evidentiary thresholds for
such grants. Furthermore, all procedural and substantive protections for
patentees mandated by this provision are built around broad and general
standards, such as “reasonable commercial terms and conditions”,
“circumstances of extreme urgency”, “purpose”, and “adequate
remuneration” that afford ample flexibility in their implementation. In our
view, Article 31 unequivocally enshrines into international IP law the
principle that CLs are a highly adaptable instrument which countries are free
to tailor as broadly or narrowly as they deem appropriate for their domestic
socio-economic milieu. It is this ample discretion that constitutes the
normative core of the TRIPS compulsory licensing regime, not the relatively
narrow safeguards that it affords to patentees.
E. The impact of the TRIPS Patent and Compulsory Licensing regimes on
Members lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities
The creation of the WTO and the advent of TRIPS were highly
controversial.204 One view was that developing countries were being forced
to implement and enforce high protection levels for IP rights that they would
have never introduced otherwise, for the meagre recompense of smoother
access to the saturated agricultural and manufacturing markets of the Global
North.205 The concern being voiced was that the world’s poor would have

203

See Dina Halajian, Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad
Compulsory Licensing is Not a Viable Solution to the Access to Medicine Program, 38
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1191, 1197–98 (2012); Susan K. Sell, TRIPs Was Never Enough: Vertical
Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 453–54 (2010–2011);
Cameron Hutchison, Over 5 Billion Not Served: The TRIPS Compulsory Licensing Export
Restriction, 5 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 43, 63–67 (2008); Bryan C. Mercurio, Trips,
Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 211, 223 (2004).
204
See generally Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 369 (2006); Frederic M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical
Patenting, 27 WORLD ECONOMY 1127 (2004); CARLOS CORREA, supra note 151, at 3–10;
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay
Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 THE WORLD ECONOMY 511 (2000);
DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103.
205
See generally Scherer, supra note 204, at 1127–32; Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare
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their access to technological inventions and creative works restricted for the
economic benefit of IP-rich corporations based in developed countries. Some
commentators went as far as describing this new international trade law
framework as an inequitable bargain, reminiscent of colonialism.206
The response to these criticisms was that the advent of globalized
international trade had made the establishment of internationally-accepted
minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of IP rights an
absolute necessity to reduce counterfeiting and free-riding.207 Proponents of
this view observed that TRIPS had mostly reiterated rules and principles
already present in other international IP conventions, with only minor
substantive and procedural additions.208 Moreover, they emphasized that the
WTO would create a forum for international dispute resolution that would be
based on the rule of law, protecting developing Members from overbearing
unilateral actions of richer countries.209
Initially conducted in the abstract, this debate soon assumed concrete
features in the realm of patents. Historically, countries that sought greater
access to unavailable or expensive patented inventions made recourse to
compulsory licensing only if there was at least one domestic manufacturer
with the necessary infrastructure and know-how to fabricate the invention in
question and compete with the patentee. When the necessary means for local
production were absent, issuing a CL was a vacuous exercise. In such
circumstances, countries looked to foreign markets where the product or
process in question was cheaply and abundantly available either due to not
being patented (Avenue 1) or because it was subject to a CL (Avenue 2).210
In the years following its entry into force, it became apparent that the
TRIPS patents and compulsory licensing regimes had the combined effect of
rendering both these avenues almost unviable.211 Article 27 disrupted Avenue

and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the Trips Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819
(2003); SUSAN K. SELL, supra note 204.
206
See generally Rahmatian, supra note 27; Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement:
Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective American Association of Law Schools’
Intellectual Property Section’s Symposium on Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (1996); DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 197–
207.
207
See generally Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS & Development, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 13–16 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Reichman,
supra note 149; BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING:GATT TRIPS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 274–77 (1997).
208
See Daniel J. Gervais, supra note 207, at 13–17; Jerome H. Reichman, Beyond the
Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and
International Trade after the GATT’s Uruguay Round Symposium: Intellectual Property and
Competition Law: Changing Views in the European Community and the United States of
America, 20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 75 (1993–1995).
209
See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together
Symposium: Intellectual Property Law in the International Marketplace: TRIPS Panel
Principal Paper, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275 (1997).
210
See Abbott, supra note 2, at 318–22 (exhaustively describing both these avenues).
211
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 923–30.
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1. By requiring that all Members implement patents for inventions in all fields
of technology, this provision all but eliminated the possibility that a product
or process would be patented in one county but not in others.212
Synchronously, Article 31(f) almost completely precluded Avenue 2 by
mandating that Members could only issue CLs “predominantly” for the
supply of their domestic market.213 In contradiction with the objectives
articulated in Article 7, the TRIPS patents and compulsory licensing regimes
made it harder for Members to access patented technologies in fields in which
they had limited manufacturing capabilities.214
Critically, this facet of the TRIPS affected developing Members most
acutely in respect of medical inventions.215 Throughout the 20th century, these
countries had overcome their limited or absent manufacturing capacity in this
sector by consistently purchasing pharmaceuticals from India, Brazil,
Argentina and a few other jurisdictions that either did not recognize patent
protection in this field or allowed the exporting of products manufactured
under compulsory licenses.216 As these Members gradually reformed their
domestic patent laws to conform with Articles 27 and 31, this longestablished international procurement route for pharmaceuticals began to
unravel. Tragically, the ensuing disruption in access to medicines concretized
precisely at the time when developing Members were desperately scrambling
to obtain the patented drugs necessary to contain the surging HIV/AIDS
epidemic.217
F. The Doha Declaration and Article 31bis
As the 21st century drew to a close, ever-louder condemnation was
levelled at the diminution in access to medicines foisted upon developing
Members with limited pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities by the
combined effect of the TRIPS patent and compulsory licensing regimes.
Bolstered by swelling support from scholars, activists and NGOs,218 a large
group of developing Members submitted a proposal to fundamentally recast
Articles 27 and 31 at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference.219 Though this

212

See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
214
See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
215
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 318–22 (exhaustively assessing the impact
of the TRIPS patents and compulsory licensing regimes on Members with limited production
capabilities);
216
See generally Finger & Schuler, supra note 204; Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization
and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical
Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009).
217
See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO
Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 620–21 (2003).
218
On the access-to-medicine movement see infra notes 280-282 and accompanying
text.
219
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Proposal by
213
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initiative was resisted by developed Members,220 it succeeded in mustering
unanimous support for the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration).221 The Doha
Declaration recognized the importance of patent protection for medical
inventions, but coextensively acknowledged “concerns about its effects on
prices”.222 Concurrently, it reiterated the unfettered sovereign prerogative of
Members to grant CLs and their “freedom to determine the grounds” upon
which they are issued.223 Expressing the key issue at the heart of the Doha
Declaration, Paragraph 6 explicitly recognized the difficulties faced by
countries with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in
“making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement”
and instructed the TRIPS Council to develop an “expeditious solution” to
resolve this problem.224 This was an explicit admission that the original
TRIPS framework governing this issue was flawed.
In 2003, after two years of contentious negotiations,225 the TRIPS Council
duly adopted the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Waiver
Decision), in which it instituted a temporary “waiver” allowing WTO

the African Group, et al., IP/C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450, 4 October 2001 (01-4803), available
at http://www.wto.org. This proposal featured a two-pronged solution. First, it suggested
establishing an official interpretation of Article 30 under which signatory states could
introduce an exception to patentees’ rights that would permit the production and export of
patented products “to address public health needs in importing Members”. Second, building
on the international law notion of “comity”, it proposed explicitly recognizing that WTO
Members with adequate capacity were authorized to “give effect” to compulsory licenses
issued by other WTO members. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 935 (providing an
extensive analysis of this proposal and suggesting that it would have been superior to Article
31bis).
220
The Proposal by the African Group was met with stark opposition from the United
States and the European Union; see Id.; DANIEL J. GERVAIS, supra note 134, ¶ 2.75-2.76.
221
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of November 14, 2001, ¶ 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration] Paragraph 1 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health
No.
WT/MIN(0)/DEC/2,
14
November
2001
available
on
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf.; See James
Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. L. TECH 291 (2002) (investigating
the legal status of the Doha Declaration in international law and suggesting that it would be
applied by the DSB as a formal amendment to the TRIPS agreement).
222
Doha Declaration, supra note 221, para. 3 (“We recognize that intellectual property
protection is important for the development of new medicines. We also recognize the
concerns about its effects on prices”).
223
Doha Declaration, supra note 221, para. 5
224
Doha Declaration, supra note 221, para. 6 (“we recognize that WTO Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.
We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to
report to the General Council before the end of 2002.”).
225
See Abbott, supra note 2, at 326–40 (explaining that three issues were at the heart of
this negotiations: scope of covered diseases, eligible importing countries, and the article(s)
of the TRIPS Agreement that would be addressed by the solution).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4039264

FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF TRIPS ARTICLE 31BIS



=

Members to grant compulsory licenses free from the obligations imposed by
Articles 31(f) and (h).226 In 2005, the WTO General Council adopted the
“Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement” (the Amendment Protocol)
which incorporated the substance of the Waiver Decision into TRIPS via the
addition therein of Article 31bis, its Annex and the Appendix to the Annex
(henceforth the Article 31bis System).227 The Amendment Protocol entered
into force in 2017, after ratification by two-thirds of Members.228
The Article 31bis System allows a Member (the Importing State) with
“insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector”229
to import patented “pharmaceutical products”230 produced under a
compulsory license granted by another Member (the Exporting State).
Procedurally, it is structured as a dialogical interaction between an Importing
and an Exporting State. At the outset, the Importing State must send a notice
to the TRIPS Council. This document is not subject to approval, yet it must
contain determinate information, including the name of the pharmaceutical
product(s) that will be imported and the “expected quantity” required.231
Moreover, unless the Importing State is an LDC,232 it must self-certify its lack
of capabilities to produce the drug in question domestically,233 and confirm

226

See General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Aug. 30, 2003), WT/L/540/Corr. 1
(1 September 2003) [hereinafter the Waiver Decision]. This Waiver is permissible because
any requirement of a WTO agreement, including TRIPS, may be waived. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 17, art. IX(3–4).
227
See WTO General Council Decision of 6 December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, WT/L/641, 8 Dec. 2005. It should be noted that both the Waiver Decision and
the Amendment Protocol were adopted subject to two identical Council Chair’s Statements
that reflected several key understandings agreed by all Members, including that
228
This threshold is established by the WTO Agreement, supra note 17, art. X
(“Amendments to provisions of this Agreement . . . shall take effect for the Members that
have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and thereafter for each
other Member upon acceptance by it.”). At the time of writing, 107 Members have ratified
the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, while Members yet to do so have until 31
December 2021; see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.
229
See TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(a)(ii).
230
See TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 1(a), (defining
“pharmaceutical product” as “any patented product, or product manufactured through a
patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems
as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
(WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2). It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture
and diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included”). Notably, this definition neither
distinguish between chemical drugs and biologics nor does it impose restrictions based on
the illness being treated.
231
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(c).
232
TRIPS, supra note 18, Appendix to The Annex To The Trips Agreement (“Leastdeveloped country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities
in the pharmaceutical sector).
233
TRIPS, supra note 18, Appendix To The Annex To The Trips Agreement
(“insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question may be
established in either of the following ways: (i) the Member in question has established that
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that it has granted, or intends to grant, a compulsory license in accordance
with Article 31 for the patented pharmaceutical product in question.234
Once the TRIPS Council has received the Importing State’s notification,
the Exporting State can issue an ECL that must still conform with Article 31
but which, crucially, is exempt from Article 31(f) “to the extent necessary for
the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to
an eligible importing Member(s)”.235 The terms of this compulsory license
must bind the licensee both to manufacture the patented pharmaceuticals in a
quantity no greater than that notified to the TRIPS Council and to export all
of them to the Importing State.236 Additionally, these products must be
clearly identifiable “through specific labelling or marking”, as well as
distinguishable through special “packaging and/or colouring/shaping of the
products themselves.237
The Exporting State must promptly notify the TRIPS Council that it has
issued the ECL and its terms.238 Prior to shipment, the licensee must create a
website through which it discloses the exact quantities of pharmaceuticals
supplied to the Importing State and the markings that render them
distinguishable.239 The Exporting State is required to pay compensation to
the patentee subject to the compulsory license in question “taking into
account the economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been
authorized in the exporting Member”.240
Notably, a Member is eligible as an Importing State only if it has notified
the TRIPS Council of its intention to use the Article 31bis System.241 As of
the time of writing, 37 developed Members had expressly elected either not
to do so at all or only in circumstances of extreme urgency.242 These opt-outs
were expressed when the Amendment Protocol was adopted, almost as an
informal political pact among technologically advanced countries not to use
the Article 31bis System to encroach upon pharmaceutical patentees’


it has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector; or) ii) where the Member has
some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has examined this capacity and found that,
excluding any capacity owned or controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient
for the purposes of meeting its needs”).
234
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(a)(iii).
235
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(c).
236
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(b)(i).
237
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(b)(ii).
238
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(c).
239
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(c).
240
TRIPS Art. 31bis(2).
241
See TRIPS, supra note 1, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 1(b) defining “eligible
importing member” as “any least-developed country Member, and any other Member that
has made a notification to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the system set out in
Article 31bis and this Annex (“system”) as an importer”.
242
The list of country that have notified the TRIPS Council of their intention to use the
Article
31bis
System
is
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm.
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rights.243 Ironically, the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the shortsightedness of this accord. As several developed Members confront the
inadequacy of their mRNA vaccine production capabilities and struggle to
secure sufficient supplies to protect their population, sensitivity towards the
plight of patentees appears to have suddenly diminished.244
The nascence of the Article 31bis System was received with
excitement.245 Government representatives, activists, and legal scholars
welcomed the creation of a compulsory licensing mechanism purposely
tailored to enable Members with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity to source patented pharmaceuticals from markets with greater
technical know-how.246 Equally, there was excitement at the prospect of the
Article 31bis System opening a new pathway for greater collaboration
between developing and developed Members. More broadly, there was hope
that this reform would be the first step towards a more equitable and
solidaristic TRIPS.247
Regrettably, this optimism has gradually dissipated as attempts to make
recourse to the Article 31bis System have been few and mostly unsuccessful.
In 2005, Ghana reportedly considered notifying the TRIPS Council of its
intention to import HIV pharmaceuticals, yet ultimately abandoned this
attempt and procured the required medications in the open market.248 In 2008,
Nepal notified the TRIPS Council that it wanted to import the
chemotherapeutic drug erlotinib.249 Natco, an Indian generic pharmaceuticals
manufacturer, applied for an ECL to supply Nepal, yet withdrew its
application later after it was sued by the local patent holder for infringement.
In 2021, in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Bolivia notified the TRIPS
Council of its intention to import 15 million doses of a vaccine patented by
Johnson & Johnson and, synchronously, entered into a supply agreement with


243

See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to CrossBorder Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 23 J.
INT. ECONOMIC LAW 535, 558–60 (2020).
244
See Id. (emphasizing that the Covid-19 pandemic has lucidly revealed how such optouts were “ill-considered” and suggesting legal avenues for “opting back in).
245
See minutes of the special meeting of the TRIPS Council meeting of 30 January 2017,
WTO document IP/C/M/84.
246
See Id.; see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 969; S. K. Verma, The Doha
Declaration and Access to Medicines by Countries Without Manufacturing Capacity, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO
RULES 623 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010).
247
See Id..
248
See WIPO ET AL., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND
INNOVATION 242 (2d ed. 2020) (describing Ghana’s attempt to make recourse to the Article
31bis System).
249
The pharmaceutical company Roche holds the patent to erlotinib and markets it
around the world under the name Tarceva. On Nepal’s attempt to use the Article 31bis see
generally Id.; Donald Harris, TRIPs after Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by
Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 390 (2011).
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Biolyse, a Canadian pharmaceutical manufacturer.250 At the time of writing,
Biolyse had lodged an application with the Canadian government for an
ECL.251 It remains to be seen whether this attempt to use the Article 31bis
System will come to fruition.
Since its creation, the Article 31bis System has been used successfully
only once by Rwanda and Canada (the Canada-Rwanda ECL).252 in July
2007, following three years of preparations spearheaded by Médecins Sans
Frontières, Rwanda notified the TRIPS Council that intended to import a
fixed-dose combination of three HIV/AIDS drugs.253 Two months later,
Canada granted an ECL to Apotex, a local manufacturer of generic
pharmaceuticals, and notified the TRIPS Council of this issuance, pursuant
to Article 31bis. By the end of 2008, after several delays, Apotex exported
the agreed medicines to Rwanda.
Eighteen years after its introduction, the extremely limited recourse to the
Article 31bis System and its low success rate raise questions about its
effectiveness in redressing the very flaw it was designed to solve.
III. FACTORS HINDERING THE ARTICLE 31BIS SYSTEM
This Part seeks to determine which factors are responsible for the
stagnation of the Article 31bis System. This is a topic which has attracted
significant attention, spawning a large but fragmented body of opinion. The
TRIPS Council has addressed this issue in every one of its annual reviews on
the “Special Compulsory Licensing System” since 2006;254 moreover, in

250

See Bolivia outlines vaccine import needs in use of WTO flexibilities to tackle
pandemic,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_10may21_e.htm
251
See Bolivia signs J&J vaccine deal with a twist - it needs WTO patent waiver,
available at https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-signs-jj-vaccine-deal-withtwist-someone-else-would-make-it-2021-05-11/.
252
See generally Nicholas G. Vincent, TRIP-Ing up: The Failure of TRIPS Article 31Bis,
24 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1 (2020); Tolulope Anthony Adekola, Has the Doha Paragraph 6
System Reached Its Limits?, 15 JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW & PRACTICE 525
(2020); Carlos Correa, supra note 40; Stacey B. Lee, Can Incentives to Generic
Manufacturers Save the Doha Declaration’s Paragraph 6, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1387 (2012–
2013); Harris, supra note 249; Brin Anderson, Better Access to Medicines: Why Countries
Are Getting Tripped up and Not Ratifying Article 31-Bis Note, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 165 (2009–2010); George Tsai, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons
for Compulsory Licensing Schemes under the WTO Doha Declaration Note, 49 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1063 (2008); Christina Cotter, The Implications of Rwanda’s Paragraph 6 Agreement
with Canada for Other Developing Countries Student Article, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV.
177 (2008).
253
See WIPO ET AL., supra note 248, at 243 (for a detailed history of the CanadaRwanda ECL, including a detailed analysis of Médecins Sans Frontières preparatory work,
Rwanda’s notification to the TRIPS council, as well as a description of the antiviral drugs in
question); Vincent, supra note 252, at 19 (providing a detailed description of this composite
drug and its formants).
254
For the most recent report, see WTO, Annual Review of The Special Compulsory
Licensing System, IP/C/86 (11 November 2020).
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2010, it held a session for Members to discuss openly implementation issues
that might be affecting ECLs.255 The WTO, WIPO and WHO have also
candidly acknowledged the inactivity of the Article 31bis System in a jointlyissued report focused on access to medical technologies and innovation.256
Furthermore, academics, activists and NGOs have produced a panoply of
diverse theories to account for the lack of success of ECLs. Considered
holistically, we find that these sources have identified four broad groups of
issues: governmental and corporate interferences, obtrusions caused by
domestic laws and free trade agreements, procedural complexities and
economic challenges. We now analyze each one in turn.
A. Governmental and Corporate Interferences
Mindful of the contentious past of compulsory licensing,257
commentators have suggested that developing Members do not make
recourse to the Article 31bis System, due to fear of retaliation from developed
Members and pharmaceutical companies.258 In support of this view, scholars
and NGOs have long decried the manner in which the United States
Government has historically weaponized Section 301 of the United States
Tariff Act 1974259 to pressure and sanction states that they deem not to protect
American intellectual property interests adequately.260 Moreover, they point
to troubling episodes that have occurred in recent past when developing


255

WTO, Minutes of Meeting Held In The Centre William Rappard On 2 March 2010,
IP/C/M/61 (1 June 2010) 35-42.
256
See WIPO ET AL., supra note 248, at 241–44.
257
See supra Part I.C.
258
See Halajian, supra note 203, at 1213–15; Harris, supra note 249, at 392; Carlos
Correa, supra note 40.
259
19 USC §221. Pursuant to this provision, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) annually prepares a report (the “Special 301” Report) examining
how foreign countries protect intellectual property rights. Those that are considered to have
adopted laws and practices with an “adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant
United States’ products” are placed on a “Priority Watch List” and may subject to unilateral
trade sanctions. All Special 301 reports are available from Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/intellectual-property/Special-301. See
generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Special 301: Its Requirements, Implementation,
and Significance, 13 FORDAM INT’L L.J. 259 (1989); Michael Palmedo, United States:
Unilateral Norm Setting Using Special 301, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND ACCESS
TO MEDICINES 274 (Ragavan Srividya & Vanni Amaka eds., 2021).
260
See Palmedo, supra note 259 (offering an exhaustive analysis of the use of Special
301 over the past two decades); Suzanne Zhou, Challenging the Use of Special 301 against
Measures Promoting Access to Medicines: Options Under the WTO Agreements, 19 J. INT.
ECONOMIC LAW 51 (2016) (charting the historical development of Special 301 and analyzing
a large number of cases in which it was used against developing countries); Sean M. Flynn,
Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Global Access to Medicines, 7 JOURNAL OF
GENERIC MEDICINES 309 (2010) (for a historical overview of Special 301 and its use during
the first term of the Obama presidency).
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Members have issued compulsory licenses.261 For example, between 2006
and 2008, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for several patented
pharmaceutical products used to treat HIV/AIDS (efavirenz,
lopinavir/ritonavir), heart disease (clopidrogel) and cancer (letrozole,
docetaxel, erlotinib, and imatinib).262 Without negotiating with patent
holders, compensation was a royalty set at 0.5% to 2% of the total sale
value.263 As Thailand provides healthcare to all residents free of cost at the
point of access, the government projected that these measures would reduce
its costs for these pharmaceuticals by a factor of 10.264
Some developed Members and the affected pharmaceutical companies
responded aggressively. In 2007, the United States placed Thailand on its
Special 301 “Priority Watch List”,265 declaring that “while the United States
acknowledges a country’s ability to issue such licenses in accordance with
WTO rules, the lack of transparency and due process exhibited in Thailand
represents a serious concern”.266 By way of sanction, the United States barred
Thai exports from entering its domestic market on a duty-free basis.267
The European Union had a mixed reaction. On one hand, the European
Commission wrote to the Thai government expressing reservations regarding
the lawfulness of its compulsory licensing practices;268 on the other, the
European Parliament passed a resolution expressing support for developing

261

See generally Brook K. Baker, Access to Medicines Activism: Collaboration,
Conflicts, and Complementarities, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND THE RIGHT TO
HEALTH: A HISTORY OF TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 295 (Srividhya Ragavan &
Amaka Vanni eds., 2020) (recounting the pressure that developed countries and
pharmaceutical corporations directed at South Africa in 1997, Brazil in 2001, Malaysia in
2003, Indonesia in 2004, and several others, in response to compulsory licensing initiatives).
262
These drugs were efavirenz, lopinavir/ritonavir, clopidogrel, letrozole, docetaxel,
erlotinib, and imatinib For an exhaustive explanation of Thailand’s approach to the grant of
these compulsory licenses see Ministry of Public Health and National Health Security Office,
Thailand, Facts and Evidences on the 10 Burning Issues Related to the Government Use of
Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand, February 2007, available at
http://digicollection.org/hss/documents/s18718en/s18718en.pdf [hereinafter the ‘Thai White
Paper’]. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 952–53 (for a detailed analysis of these
Thai compulsory licenses and the ensuing reaction from states and pharmaceutical
companies); Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing: Separating Strands of Fact from
Fiction under Trips, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 411–41 (2009) (providing an
extensive legal analysis of these Thai CLs).
263
Thai White Paper, supra note 262, 17.
264
Thai White Paper, supra note 262, 11-15.
265
See supra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
266
See
USTR
2007
Special
301
Report,
27
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2007%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.
267
Reports of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Panel on Access to
Medicines, Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, (2016) 7
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02
cd3d4/1473890031320/UNSG+HLP+Report+FINAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf
Accessed
19/02/2017, p. 25
268
Letter from Peter Mandelson, E.U. Trade Commissioner to Krirk-krai Jirapaet, Thai
Minister of Commerce (July 10, 2007), available at https://www.keionline.org/wpcontent/uploads/mandelson07102007.pdf
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Members that take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities to protect their citizens’
right of access to medicines.269 Meanwhile, Sanofi, the patent holder for
clopidrogel, threatened to sue the Indian company involved in exporting the
pharmaceutical in question into Thailand.270 Even more troubling, Abbott,
the patent holder for lopinavir/ritonavir, withdrew an array of new medicines
for blood clots, kidney diseases, arthritis, high blood pressure, viral infection
and inflammation from the Thai market.271 Although this vindictive measure
was later reversed, Thai patients suffered unnecessary harm at the hands of a
private foreign actor. They were deprived of access to essential treatments,
some of which had no alternative, for the duration of the entire dispute.
We agree that compulsory licensing, both under Article 31 and the Article
31bis System, are vulnerable to governmental and private retaliatory
initiatives, including punitive trade policies and pharmaceutical product
withdrawals. Such actions should be condemned unreservedly. They show
arrogant disregard for Articles 7-8,272 the flexibilities included in the TRIPS
patent regime,273 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,274 the Doha
Declaration,275 and Article 31bis(4) which explicitly prohibits Members not
to challenge legitimately-issued ECLs.276 Even worse, these maneuvers
encroach upon the national sovereignty of the targeted Members. They
constitute a contemptible exploitation of the asymmetrical power relationship
that exists between the Global North and the Global South in trade relations.
This notwithstanding, we believe that there is robust evidence to counter
the view that the Article 31bis System has been scarcely utilized due to the
fear of governmental and corporate reprisals. First, the stance of developed
Members and pharmaceutical companies towards compulsory licensing has
evolved considerably in the years since the adoption of TRIPS, and especially
following the Doha Declaration. During the late 1990s and early 2000s,
almost every instance of developing Members issuing compulsory licenses
for a pharmaceutical product was characterized by political pressure and trade
sanctions from national governments, often led by the United States, as well
as staunch opposition from patent holders.277

269

European Parliament resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS Agreement and access
to
medicines,
P6_TA-PROV(2007)0353,
para
9,
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?Type=TA&Reference=P6-TA-20070353&language=EN.
270
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 953–54.
271
See generally V. Kuek et al., Access to Medicines and Domestic Compulsory
Licensing: Learning from Canada and Thailand, 6 GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 111 (2011) Paul
Cawthorne et al., Access to Drugs: The Case of Abbott in Thailand. (2007) (for a
contemporaneous account of these events).
272
See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
273
See supra Part II.B.1.
274
See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text.
275
See supra note 221-226 and accompanying text.
276
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 34bis(4) (“Members shall not challenge any measures
taken in conformity with the provisions of this Article and the Annex to this Agreement”).
277
See Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing, and South African Health
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However, over the past ten years, such hostile responses have become
infrequent and less intense, while not vanishing entirely.278 Analyzing the
conduct of the United States in recent cases, one commentator has gone as
far as stating that “its bark is much worse than its bite”.279 This shift has
largely been due to the “heroic civil society struggle” of the access-tomedicine movement (A2M).280 Crucially, between 1999 and 2008, the A2M
coordinated global awareness campaigns to censure and oppose the
retaliatory initiatives directed at South Africa, Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand following their grant of compulsory licenses over
pharmaceuticals.281 As a result, in all these cases, the patent holders and
national governments responsible for these punitive actions received
widespread condemnation from the international public, suffered
substantial reputational damage and ultimately withdrew their opposition.282
Second, domestic and export compulsory licensing curtail patentees’
rights in the exact same measure. If there were reluctance to use the Article
31bis System due to fear of retaliatory actions, the same would be true for
CLs granted to supply the internal market of the issuing country. However,
recent empirical evidence shows that Members of all income levels are
regularly and effectively making recourse to domestic compulsory licensing
for a growing range of patented pharmaceutical products.283 Son and Lee

Policy: Managing Confrontation with US Firms and Politicians, 29 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF HEALTH SERVICES 765 (1999) (providing an account of the political pressure
exercised by the United States on South Africa due to its compulsory licensing policy);
Haroon Ashraf, USA and Brazil End Dispute over Essential Drugs, 357 THE LANCET 2112
(2001) (analyzing the contrast between United States and Brazil regarding patent protection
of HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals); Ho, supra note 262, at 411–41 (detailing the political and
corporate pressures encountered by Thailand following the issuance of CLs on several patent
pharmaceuticals).
278
See Baker, supra note 261, at 302–19 (describing both the progressive shift in stance
of developed Members and the increasingly more collaborative attitude of pharmaceutical
companies).
279
Id. at 306; see also Brook Baker, Don’t Be Afraid of Compulsory Licenses Despite
US Threats: Special 301 Reports 1998–2017 – Listing Concerns But Taking Little Action,
Available at https://healthgap.org/dont-be-afraid-of-compulsory-licenses-despite-us-threatsspecial-301-reports-1998-2017-listing-concerns-but-taking-little-action/.
280
See generally Baker, supra note 261; ‘T HOEN, supra note 2, at 31–73; Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Susan K. Sell, Trips and the Access to Medicines
Campaign Proceedings of the 2002 Conference - Access to Medicines in the Developing
World: International Facilitation or Hindrance, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481 (2001–2002).
281
See Baker, supra note 261, at 302–19 (providing numerous bibliographical references
to contemporary accounts of the unfolding events); Thomas Owen, The ‘Access to
Medicines’ Campaign Vs. Big Pharma, 11 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUDIES 288 (2014);
Nathan Ford et al., The Role of Civil Society in Protecting Public Health over Commercial
Interests: Lessons from Thailand, 363 THE LANCET 560 (2004).
282
See Baker, supra note 261, at 302–19.
283
See See Medicines Law & Policy, The TRIPS Flexibilities Database, available at
http://tripsflexibilities.medicineslawandpolicy.org/ [hereinafter the TRIPS Flexibilities
Database]; Kyung-Bok Son & Tae-Jin Lee, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals
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have documented 108 attempts to issue CLs, for 40 different pharmaceuticals
products, across 27 countries, between 1995 and 2018.284 These efforts
yielded 53 CLs, 18 price reductions, and 16 voluntary licenses, failing to
achieve tangible results only in 21 cases. More than half of these attempts
involved patented pharmaceuticals for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, yet
influenza and cancer medicines have been increasingly subject to CLs over
the past decade.285 Between 2018 and 2020, there have been 10 additional
applications for CLs, some of which in high income countries, for
pharmaceuticals treating HIV/AIDS and cancer, but also opioid overdose,
hepatitis C and cystic fibrosis.286 Even more recently, Israel, Russia, and
Hungary have issued CLs to increase the supply of pharmaceuticals used to
treat Covid-19, with commentators and NGOs actively encouraging other
countries to follow suit.287
B. Domestic Law and Free Trade Agreements Obtrusions
The WTO legal order does not preclude Members from entering into
multilateral, regional or bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) that introduce

Reconsidered: Current Situation and Implications for Access to Medicines, 13 GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH 1430 (Oct. 2018); Ellen F.M. ‘t Hoen et al., Medicine Procurement and the
Use of Flexibilities in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2001–2016, 96 BULL WORLD HEALTH ORGAN 185, 190 (Mar. 2018) (carrying out a
comprehensive empirical study on the use compulsory licensing and concluding that “our
study shows that TRIPS flexibilities have been used more frequently than is commonly
assumed and have proven effective for procuring generic versions of essential medicines,
particularly for treating HIV infections”); Son & Lee, supra (analyzing available empirical
data and concluding that “there have been more attempts to issue compulsory licensing and
for more pharmaceuticals, especially for oncology, than previously reported. This means that
compulsory licensing that had been devised to cope with the HIV/AIDS pandemic in lowincome countries has become a practical measure in several Asian and Latin American
countries, even for non-HIV/AIDS medicines.”). See also Eduardo Urias & Shyama V.
Ramani, Access to Medicines after TRIPS: Is Compulsory Licensing an Effective Mechanism
to Lower Drug Prices? A Review of the Existing Evidence, 3 J. INT. BUS. POLICY 367 (2020)
(reviewing a large body of empirical evidence and concluding that CLs on pharmaceutical
patents yield material price reductions).
284
See Son & Lee, supra note 283. These data are consistent with those of the TRIPS
Flexibilities Database as well as previous empirical studies; see ‘t Hoen et al., supra note
283; Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since
the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MEDICINE (2012).
285
See Son & Lee, supra note 283; the TRIPS Flexibilities Database.
286
See The TRIPS Flexibilities Database.
287
See Hilary Wong, The Case for Compulsory Licensing during COVID-19, 10 J.
GLOB. HEALTH (2020); World Trade Organization, Patent-Related Actions taken in WTO
Members in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, WTO Working Papers, No. 2020/12
(2020) available at https://doi.org/10.30875/fb500072-en (discussing CLs issued by Israel
and Hungary); Médecins Sans Frontières, Compulsory licenses, the TRIPS waiver and access
to Covid-19 medical technologies, MSF Briefing Document (2021) available at
https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/202105/COVID_TechBrief_MSF_AC_IP_CompulsoryLicensesTRIPSWaiver_ENG_21May20
21_0.pdf (discussing CLs issued by Israel, Hungary and Russia).
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higher IP protection standards than those established by TRIPS (commonly
referred to as “TRIPS-Plus”), including restrictions on ECLs.288 Equally,
Members are free to enact domestic patent legislation that either directly or
indirectly limits ECLs.
Commentators have advanced the view that there is a growing body of
domestic laws,289 and TRIPS-Plus FTAs which undermine the Article 31bis
System.290 Regarding the former, Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime
(CAMR) has been highlighted as worrisome example.291 At the time of its
enactment, CAMR was heralded as a regime expressly designed to aid
developing countries. Nevertheless, the legislative text imposes restrictions
that are not demanded by TRIPS. Notably, it sets the maximum duration of
compulsory export licenses to two years.292 Moreover, it circumscribes the

288

As a general proposition WTO rules encourage Members to enter into free trade
agreements; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33
I.L.M. 1153 (1994), Article XXIV(4) (“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of
increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.”). See
generally Pedro Roffe, Intellectual Property Chapters in Free Trade Agreements: Their
Significance and Systemic Implications, in EU BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 17 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2014)
(providing an exhaustive survey of FTAs that introduce IP standards above those included
in TRIPS).
289
See generally Halajian, supra note 203, at 1216; Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler et al.,
Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime: Promise or Failure of Humanitarian Effort?, 5
HEALTHCARE POLICY 40 (2010); Amir Attaran, Why Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime
Can Never Succeed UNBLJ Forum: Recent Developments in Private International Law, 60
U.N.B.L.J. 150 (2010); Richard Elliott, Pledges and Pitfalls: Canada’s Legislation on
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals for Export, 1 INT. J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT (2006).
290
See generally HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016); ERMIAS TEKESTE BIADGLENG & JEANCHRISTOPHE MAUR, THE INFLUENCE OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
FIRST LOOK (2011); Hafiz Aziz ur Rehman, India, TRIPs-Plus Free Trade Agreements and
the Future of Access to Essential Medicines, 19 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 267 (2010); Susan
K. Sell, supra note 203, at 453; Bryan Christopher Mercurio, Trips-Plus Provisions in Ftas:
Recent Trends, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & POLICY (2006); Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in
Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 79 (2004).
291
Canada was the first country to adopt domestic legislation implementing the Article
31bis System. In 2005, it amended the Canadian Patent Act 1985, R.S.C. to include new
sections 21.01-21.19. See Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act (the
Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act), S.C. 2004, c.23. See generally Cohen-Kohler et al.,
supra note 289; Attaran, supra note 289; Tsai, supra note 252; Paige E. Goodwin, Right
Idea, Wrong Result - Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime Notes and Comments, 34 AM.
J.L. & MED. 567 (2008); Elliott, supra note 289; Mark D. Penner & Prakash Narayanan,
Amendments to the Canadian Patent Act to Address Drug Access: Is Help on the Way?, 60
FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL 459 (2005).
292
See Attaran, supra note 289 (highlighting that no other country has introduced such
a restriction in their domestic implementation of the Article 31bis System); Elliott, supra
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pharmaceuticals that may be manufactured under such licenses to those
included in a special list (Schedule 1) the amendment of which is subject to
a dedicated administrative procedure.293 Placing an ulterior onus on licensees,
the Canadian Patent Act also requires that all medicines produced for export
must meet Canadian marketing approval standards, rather than those of the
Importing State.294
Regarding TRIPS-Plus FTAs, concerns have been raised about bilateral
agreements that directly limit compulsory licensing.295 For example, under
the US-Jordan FTA,296 the US-Singapore FTA,297 and the US-Australia
FTA,298 signatory states agree to only issue compulsory licenses, both for
domestic purposes and when acting as an Exporting State, to address a narrow
set of issues: anti-competitive practices of patent holders, public noncommercial use and circumstances of extreme urgency.299 Going even
further, the US-Singapore FTA and US-Australia FTA also provide that
patent holders cannot be compelled to assist compulsory licensees by having
to share “undisclosed information or technical know-how”.300
Equally, TRIPS-Plus FTAs which contain data exclusivity provisions301

note 289, at 107 (criticizing this unnecessary time restriction and highlighting its negative
consequences); Goodwin, supra note 291, at 578–79.
293
See Elliott, supra note 289, at 100–101 (detailing the political debate that led to this
policy decision); Goodwin, supra note 291, at 574. 578-579 (emphasizing that no other
country has imposed a comparable limitation when implementing Article 31bis); Tsai, supra
note 252, at 1094–95.
294
See Attaran, supra note 289, at 159 (suggesting that this requirement is necessary)
Elliott, supra note 289, at 103 (expressing a negative view of this requirement).
295
See generally Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
under BITs, FTAs and TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence?, in EVOLUTION
IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 485 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds.,
2011); Bryan Christopher Mercurio, supra note 290; Carlos M. Correa, supra note 290.
296
United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63
[hereinafter US-Jordan FTA].; see Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus
Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438 (2007).
297
United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 16.7(2), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026 [hereinafter US-Singapore FTA].
298
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.9(7)(b)(iii), May 18, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter US-Australia].
299
See Gaëlle P. Krikorian & Dorota M. Szymkowiak, Intellectual Property Rights in
the Making: The Evolution of Intellectual Property Provisions in US Free Trade Agreements
and Access to Medicine, 10 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 388, 402–4
(2007) (analyzing the provisions that directly limit compulsory licensing in all major FTAs
negotiated by the United States between 1994-2007); Harris, supra note 249, at 384–384
(analyzing the reach of TRIPs-Plus FTAs negotiated by the United States).
300
See US-Singapore FTA, art. 16.7; US-Australia FTA, art. 17.9.
301
Albeit with differences across jurisdictions, data exclusivity regimes typically
provide that safety and efficacy clinical trial data submitted by a patent holder to obtain sale
approval by the national authorities of a state cannot be relied upon by competitors for a
fixed period of time. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical
Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods
Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy,
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have been denounced as detrimental to the Article 31bis System.302 For
example, the USA-Singapore FTA, US-Jordan FTA,303 the US-Australia
FTA,304 the US-Chile FTA,305 and the US-Morocco FTA306 provide that if a
signatory state requires the submission of information concerning the safety
and efficacy of a pharmaceutical to authorize its marketing and sale, patentees
cannot be mandated to share their own data with compulsory licensees, for a
period of time that ranges from three to five years from the date when the
patent was originally granted.307
We agree that domestic legislation and multilateral FTAs that directly or
indirectly impede the issuance of ECLs are troubling. If the majority of the
Members with mature pharmaceutical industries chose this path, the Article
31bis System might be rendered dead letter. Nevertheless, in our view, this is
not the situation at present and there is encouraging evidence that the
international community is moving in the opposite direction. Firstly, almost
all Members with advanced pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities have
enacted domestic laws implementing the Article 31bis System that do not
restrict the grant of compulsory export licenses.308 Even Canada has explored
the possibility of reforming its own framework.309

Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of
Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004);
Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data
Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals Symposium: Public Health and
International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69 (2002).
302
See generally Médecins Sans Frontières, Data Exclusivity in International Trade
Agreements: What Consequences for Access to Medicines?, MSF Technical Brief (May
2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/DataExclusivityMay04.pdf.
303
United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63
[hereinafter US-Jordan FTA].; see El-Said & El-Said, supra note 296
304
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.9(7)(b)(iii), May 18, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter US-Australia].
305
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.10(b), June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026.
306
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.10(4), June 15, 2004, 44
I.L.M. 544.
307
See Krikorian & Szymkowiak, supra note 299, at 399–402 (analyzing the data
exclusivity provisions of all major FTAs negotiated by the United States between 19942007).
308
An exhaustive database of the national laws adopted by Members to implement the
Article
31bis
System
is
available
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/par6laws_e.htm; see generally Roger Kampf,
Special Compulsory Licences for Export of Medicines: Key Features of WTO Members’
Implementing Legislation, No. ERSD-2015-07 (World Trade Organization (WTO),
Economic Research and Statistics Division 2015) (providing a comparative analysis of all
the national legislations adopted to implement the Article 31bis System up to 2015).
309
See Daniele Dionisio, Amending Canada’s Access To Medicines Regime (CAMR): The
New Fate Of Bill C-393, IP Watch (2011) available at https://www.ipwatch.org/2011/06/28/amending-canada%E2%80%99s-access-to-medicines-regime-camrthe-new-fate-of-bill-c-393/. Having passed the Canadian lower house of Parliament, Bill C393 stalled in the Senate and was not enacted; see Lindsey Amèrica-Simms & Richard
Elliott, Senate Stalling Derails Bill to Fix Canada’s Law on Affordable Generic Medicines
for Developing Countries., 15 HIV/AIDS POLICY & LAW REVIEW 24 (2011).
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Secondly, the problematic FTAs negotiated by the United States in the
early 2000s were met by a wave of criticism by NGOs, international
organizations and scholars, engendering significant public backlash.310 In
more recent times, the United States has entered into multilateral
arrangements negotiated with Peru, Panama, Colombia and South Korea that
expressly refer to the Doha Declaration and do not contain direct or indirect
restrictions on the granting of compulsory export licenses.311 In similar vein,
the recently ratified United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)312
was ultimately stripped of data exclusivity provisions that would have
undermined the Article 31bis System;313 this is especially significant in light
of the fact that the previous North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) contained restrictions on export compulsory licensing.314 It should
also be noted that FTAs negotiated by the European Union have generally
not included restrictions to ECLs.315 This is also true of recently multilateral
agreements recently signed in by Asian and Oceanian Members, including
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP)316 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP).317

310

On the Access-to-medicine movement see supra notes 280-283 and accompanying

text.
311

See United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 15.10, June 28, 2007;
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 16.10(2), Apr. 12, 2006; United StatesColombia Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 16.10(2), Nov. 22, 2006. United States-South
Korea Free Trade Agreement, art. 18.11 Feb. 10, 2011. See generally Krikorian &
Szymkowiak, supra note 299, at 402–4.
312
Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and
Canada, Nov. 30, 2018, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetradeagreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter
USMCA].
313
See Ronald Labonté et al., USMCA (NAFTA 2.0): Tightening the Constraints on the
Right to Regulate for Public Health, 15 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH 35 (detailing how
negotiations in the House of Representative ultimately resulted in the elimination of terms
that would have assured ten years of data exclusivity for newly approved biologic
medicines).
314
See North American Free Trade Agreement Art. 1709(10)(f), United States-CanadaMexico, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (restricting compulsory licenses to the supply
of the domestic market of the issuer and not contemplating exceptions to accommodate the
Article 31bis System).
315
See Roffe, supra note 288 (noting that the EU has focused on geographical
indications in its TRIPS-Plus FTAs, rather than patents and compulsory licensing). The
notable exception is the Trade Agreement between the European Union, and its Member
States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, OJ L 354, 21.12.2012, 3–
260, introducing a data exclusivity regime with a five-year term under art. 231.2.
316
See Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 357, 396–98 (2019)
(emphasizing that provisions on strengthening patent protection, as well as data exclusivity
were removed from this treaty as soon as the US withdrew from negotiations).
317
See Deborah K. Elms, Getting RCEP across the Line, 20 WORLD TRADE REVIEW
373 (2021) (detailing the content of this FTA and highlighting the absence of provisions that
go beyond TRIPS substantive minima for patent protection).
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C. Procedural Complexities
The Article 31bis System is governed by a protracted and onerous multistep procedure, punctuated by detailed requirements.318 The Importing State
must comply with a series of information disclosure obligations in its
notification to the TRIPS Council.319 Coextensively, the Exporting State must
issue highly-specific compulsory licenses, pay compensation to the affected
patentee, and keep the TRIPS Council duly informed.320 Moreover, the
licensee is also required to make public disclosures regarding the
manufactured pharmaceuticals.321
Commentators have vigorously contended that the procedural dimension
of the Article 31bis System is acutely problematic for developing Members,
going as far as describing it as a “labyrinth”.322 As a general criticism, they
remark that, when assessed in its entirety, the process is too protracted and
demands an unrealistic degree of coordination among parties.323 Regarding
Importing States, the obligation for non-LDC Members to supply evidence
of their insufficient manufacturing capabilities has been singled out as a
heavy burden for “an already potentially strapped-for-resources member”.324
Scholars and NGOs have also denounced the requirement that Importing
States specify the exact required quantity of the pharmaceutical in question,
not only because this might be a challenging estimation ex ante, but
particularly because the Article 31bis System does not contemplate a renewal
or amendment mechanism to increase supply of the imported product after an
ECL has been granted.325
Still sharper criticisms have been levied at the procedural burdens
imposed on Exporting States and licensees. The prerequisite to negotiate with
patent holders before an ECL can be issued326 has been decried as a likely
source of significant delays, especially when multiple patentees are


318

See supra notes 229-244 and accompanying text.
319
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(a).
320
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(b)(i)-(ii).
321
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(b)(iii).
322
See Baker, supra note 217, at 655; See generally Vincent, supra note 252; Carlos
Correa, supra note 40; Halajian, supra note 203, at 1202–4; Harris, supra note 249; Verma,
supra note 246; Cohen-Kohler et al., supra note 289.
323
See Carlos Correa, supra note 40; Baker, supra note 217, at 655.
324
See Vincent, supra note 252, at 22.
325
See Carlos Correa, supra note 40, at 3; Muhammad Z. Abbas & Shamreeza Riaz,
WTO Paragraph 6 System for Affordable Access to Medicines: Relief or Regulatory
Ritualism, 21 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 32, 39 (2018); Lee, supra note 252, at 1402.
326
This is a consequence of the fact that ECLs issued under Article 31bis must comply
with the requirements of Article 31, including Article 31(b). See supra notes 229-244 and
accompanying text. See generally Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler et al., Canada’s Implementation
of the Paragraph 6 Decision: Is It Sustainable Public Policy?, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH 12
(remarking that this requirement turned out to be especially problematic in the CanadaRwanda ECL).
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involved.327 Commentators have also expressed strong reservations about the
obligation to differentiate products manufactured under an ECL through
special colouring and shaping of the pharmaceutical itself.328 Such alterations
are time-consuming, and can often involve a biomolecular investigation of
the patented medicine in question to ensure that the generic which is being
manufactured has the same bioequivalence and bioavailability.329
We share the view that the procedural dimension of the Article 31bis
System materially hinders export compulsory licensing. The issue lies with
the normative aims that shape this body of rules. This entire procedure is
designed primarily to ensure that medicines produced under an ECL are not
surreptitiously diverted into more pecunious markets and, to a lesser extent,
verify that the Importing State is eligible to use the Article 31bis System.
Regrettably, the rules under consideration do not prioritize efficiency,
simplicity and expediency for the relevant stakeholders. This is both
disappointing and surprising given that the explicit mandate of the Doha
Declaration was to create a “solution” to the difficulties faced by Members
with insufficient manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector in
making effective use of the Article 31 regime for compulsory licensing.
We are not especially troubled by the information disclosures demanded
of Importing States regarding their lack of manufacturing capacity. This
condition is easily satisfied through a self-certification which is not subject
to approval by the TRIPS Council and that could only be called into question
in the unlikely event of a Member contesting its accuracy before the DSB.330
By contrast, we find that the provisos established to prevent diversion are
problematic, due to their lack of flexibility, complexity, and protracted
nature. They are in no way calibrated according to the actual circumstances
of the case in question, such as the type of pharmaceutical involved, the
nature of the illness (acquired, acute, chronic, congenital, genetic or
infectious), the market size and purchasing power of the Importing State and
whether there is an ongoing emergency. The assumption that permeates these
rules appears to be that ECLs immanently and invariably carry an extremely
high risk of diversion the avoidance of which is paramount.
It is hard to quantify the measure in which these procedural burdens deter
recourse to Article 31bis. Nevertheless, it is emblematic that Apotex, the
Canadian manufacturer that was involved in Rwanda’s case, has repeatedly
pointed to the “complexity of the process” as one of the primary reasons for
many delays which afflicted the project and, ultimately, its decision to not

327

Carlos Correa, supra note 40, at 4; Abbas & Riaz, supra note 325, at 40; Vincent,
supra note 252, at 18.
328
TRIPS, supra note 18, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, 2(b)ii.
329
See Baker, supra note 217, at 650; Carlos Correa, supra note 40, at 9; Abbas & Riaz,
supra note 325, at 40; Vincent, supra note 252, at 18.
330
See Paul Vandoren & Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, The WTO Decision on Paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Making It Work, 6
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 779, 785 (2003) (who observe that “the self-assessment of the
available capacity and the subsequent conclusion fall under the exclusive responsibility of
the Member itself”).
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participate in such initiatives in future.331
D. Economic Challenges
The Article 31bis System is built on the unstated premise that Members
with mature pharmaceutical industries harbour a sizeable constituency of
manufacturers interested in fulfilling the demand of Importing States. The
underlying view appears to be that the international patent system is the main
obstacle preventing these producers from entering these markets and that
export compulsory licensing will remove this barrier. We believe that these
assumptions are flawed in that they underappreciate the economic challenges
of these transactions.
First, manufacturing, distributing and selling pharmaceuticals under
ECLs is a capital-intensive activity that requires large up-front investment.
Production costs are substantial. For chemical-based drugs, research is
required to determine the composition of the compound in question and
synthesize a stable formulation.332 In the case of biologics, this reverseengineering exercise is still more challenging due to the inherent difficulties
associated with the creation of biosimilars.333 This initial step is followed by
the planning and realization of the processes necessary for reliable and
quality-consistent manufacturing. Throughout, compulsory licensees must
experiment by way of trial and error, as they generally receive no technical
assistance from the patentees the invention of which they are replicating. All
these operations are time-consuming and expensive.
Regulatory costs are also significant. All pharmaceuticals manufacturers
must bear the expenditures involved in obtaining the necessary authorizations
from the competent governmental authorities in the jurisdictions in which
they want to market and sell their products. For drugs that are molecularly
identical to previously-approved patented ones, this process can be relatively
painless;334 by contrast, for biologics, approval of biosimilars can be lengthy

331

Letter from John Hems, Dir., Can.'s Access to Medicines Regime, to Douglas Clark
& Brigitte Zirger, Dirs., Apotex Inc. (Jan. 23, 2007), available at
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/camr-rcam/reviewreviser/camr_rcam_apotex_18-eng.pdf; Press Release, Apotex Inc., Second Shipment of
Life-Saving AIDS Drugs Leaving for Africa (Sept. 18, 2009), available at
https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/second-shipment-of-life-saving-aids-drug-leavingfor-africa-538566052.html.
332
See generally Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical
Companies, 3 J PHARM INNOV 30; Pradeep Suresh & Prabir K. Basu, Improving
Pharmaceutical Product Development and Manufacturing: Impact on Cost of Drug
Development and Cost of Goods Sold of Pharmaceuticals, 3 J PHARM INNOV 175.
333
See generally Leyre Zuñiga & Begoña Calvo, Biosimilars: Pharmacovigilance and
Risk Management, 19 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY AND DRUG SAFETY 661 (2010); Simon D.
Roger, Biosimilars: How Similar or Dissimilar Are They? (Review Article), 11 NEPHROLOGY
341 (2006); Anoop Misra, Are Biosimilars Really Generics?, 10 EXPERT OPINION ON
BIOLOGICAL THERAPY 489.
334
See generally Blackstone & Joseph, supra note 40.
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and expensive, going as far as requiring clinical trials.335 Notably, export
compulsory licensees may have to cover these outlays twice, if they are
required to obtain regulatory approval both in the Exporting and Importing
State. In addition, the Article 31bis System imposes its own cost layer. Export
compulsory licensees must cover all the expenses associated with antidiversion obligations, including that of using special packaging, labelling, as
well as making information disclosures through a dedicated website.336
Moreover, they might also be required to pay the “adequate remuneration”
owed to patentees under Article 31(h).337
Second, export compulsory licensees are confronted with a difficult and
narrow path to profitability. Typically, Importing States will be developing
Members with very low yearly health spending per capita that can only afford
low prices for any one pharmaceutical product.338 This datum significantly
narrows the range of pricing strategies that export compulsory licensees can
implement to generate the revenues to make the whole endeavour sustainable.
In such circumstances, a low-volume, high margin approach will be entirely
unworkable. The only viable avenue will be to employ a high volume, low
margin strategy.
In theory, the export compulsory licensee would manufacture the
patented pharmaceutical product in question in large volumes with the aim of
achieving economies of scale;339 progressively, this would reduce marginal
production costs, making it possible to attain a price point that is both
affordable for the Importing State and sufficiently profitable for the
manufacturer. In practice, however, such a strategy is not always feasible.
Crucially, the compulsory licensee will be unable to reach economies of scale
if only a small quantity of pharmaceutical products is requested by the
Importing State in its notification to the TRIPS Council.340 Similarly, even if
economies of scale are achieved, the investments required to produce,
distribute and sell the patented pharmaceutical in question may be too great
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See generally Steven Simoens & Arnold G. Vulto, A Health Economic Guide to
Market Access of Biosimilars, 21 EXPERT OPINION ON BIOLOGICAL THERAPY 9 (Taylor &
Francis Jan. 2021).
336
See supra notes 229-244 and accompanying text.
337
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
338
See World Health Organization, Global Spending on Health: Weathering the Storm
2 (2020) (estimating that, in 2018, yearly health spending per capita in low-income countries
was $40, $115 in lower middle income countries, $466 in upper middle-income countries
and $3,313 in high income countries).
339
Economies of scale refers to the phenomenon where the average costs per unit of
output decrease with the increase in the scale or magnitude of the output being produced by
a firm; see generally Aubrey Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice, 82 THE
ECONOMIC JOURNAL 369 (1972); George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 THE JOURNAL
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 54, 54 (1958).
340
Notably, under the Article 31bis System, export compulsory licensee can
manufacture no more than exact quantity requested by the Importing State; see supra notes
229-244 and accompanying text. See Mike Gumbel, Is Article 31BIS Enough - The Need to
Promote Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System Notes &
Comments, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 161 (2008).
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to be recoverable at a price point affordable for the Importing State.
Third, export compulsory licensees face substantial risk to revenue and
heavy losses on their investment. Above all, they are extremely vulnerable to
patentees lowering the prices of their pharmaceutical products – or even
donating them – for the purpose of defending their position in the Importing
State’s market. This risk can materialize at any moment in time and the export
compulsory licensee has no effective mitigating strategy. This is compounded
by the fact that the Article 31bis System does not contemplate confidentiality
safeguards. The notifications sent to the TRIPS Council by both the
Importing and Exporting States are public, effectively providing patentees
with all the information necessary to monitor the unfolding of the process and
react at the most opportune moment.
It has been suggested that if patentees were to cut prices voluntarily when
faced with the prospect of a Member making recourse to Article 31bis, this
would be a desirable outcome for Importing States.341 However, this view
overlooks the risk that pharmaceutical manufacturers decline to engage with
Article 31bis System as a whole, in fear that patentees could undercut their
prices at any time.
Export compulsory licensees are also exposed to litigation risk. Patentees
can take legal action to challenge the compulsory license granted by the
Export State. Even if ultimately unsuccessful, such maneuvers can cause
delays and financial stress.342 In like fashion, patentees can promote
infringement proceedings against the export compulsory licensee if they have
evidence that pharmaceutical products have been diverted away from the
Importing State into a different market. Albeit to a lesser degree, ECLs may
also be exposed to political instability risk. Military conflict, civil unrest and
regime change can either impede the compulsory licensee from generating
the revenues necessary to recover its investment or cause the Importing State
to default on its obligation to purchase the pharmaceuticals in question.
We believe that the primary reason the Article 31bis System has remained
largely unutilized to date is that the market conditions that would make a
particular ECL economically viable are seldom present. In general,
compulsory licensing is an instrument that ontologically has only situational
usability. For it to be viable, the compulsory licensee must be in a position to
manufacture the patented product and sell it at a price which is lower than
that charged by the patentee, but high enough to generate revenues sufficient
to cover its costs and make a small profit.343
The Article 31bis System makes achieving this threshold markedly
harder. In the context of an expensive industry, its procedural and substantive
rules impose significant extra costs, engender idiosyncratic litigation risks

341

See Carlos Correa, supra note 40.
342
It should be noted that some Members, such as Argentina, have enacted provision
pursuant to which an appeal by the patent owner against the grant of a compulsory license
does not suspend its immediate execution; see Argentine Patent Law No. 24.481, art. 49.
Nevertheless, most Members do not offer such protections for compulsory licensees.
343
See Cahoy, supra note 10, at 481.
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and concurrently impede the possibility of achieving economies of scale. For
prospective export compulsory licensees that are already in the difficult
position of having to deal with Member States with limited purchasing power,
these obstacles become all but insurmountable.
Emblematically, representatives of the Canadian generic drugs industry
that were involved in the Canada-Rwanda ECL have claimed that they are
unwilling to engage with the Article 31bis System in the future, due to the
quasi-impossibility of operating profitably within its boundaries.344 Echoing
this sentiment, a representative of the Indian generic drug manufacturer
CIPLA expressed skepticism towards export compulsory licensing,
remarking that the economics of this mechanism were unworkable in cases
such as that of Rwanda due to its minimal financial resources and small
market size.345 In similar vein, Médecins Sans Frontières pointedly criticised
the Article 31bis System stating that “it … ignores the fact that economies of
scale are needed to attract interest of producers” and concluded that “without
the pull of a viable market for drugs, generics manufacturers will not seek to
produce for export”.346
IV. FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF ARTICLE 31BIS
This Part proposes approaches to fulfill the promise of the Article 31bis
System to furnish Members with an instrument to overcome the strictures
imposed by the combined effect of Articles 27 and 31. First, we highlight that
ECLs possess unique and unprecedented features which could have a decisive
impact for access to medicines in Members lacking pharmaceutical
manufacturing capabilities. We posit that it would be unwise for Members to
abandon the Articles 31bis System in favour of alternative approaches, such
as public medicine patent pools and humanitarian aid campaigns.347 From this
premise, we expound strategies that Members can pursue within the confines
of the current law to circumvent some of the issues that presently undermine
ECLs. Thereafter, we consider a broad range of possible reforms to the
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See Cohen-Kohler et al., supra note 326, at 4 (who interviewed executives of
Canadian generic drugs manufacturers and found that they had strong reservations regarding
the possibility of operating profitably under an ECL. One executive stated "we might end up
with a couple of orders, but at the end of the day we won't make any money out of it, and I'm
going to get to a point where someone else comes along, like [NGO], and say "we want this
other compound", I'm not going to be able to develop it, because I'm in business to make
money and I can only do so many products.”).
345
See IP Watch, WTO ‘Paragraph 6’ System For Affordable Medicine: Time For
Change? available at https://www.ip-watch.org/2016/11/14/wto-paragraph-6-systemaffordable-medicines-time-change/ (reporting that the head of government affairs at Indian
generic drug company Cipla observed that “the amount of drugs supplied in the 2 years was
lower than the amount Cipla produces per month.”).
346
See Médecins Sans Frontières, Review of the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime
– Submission to the Government of Canada (24 January 2007), available at
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/camr-rcam/reviewreviser/camr_rcam_msf_11-eng.pdf.
347
See below Part IV.A.
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Article 31bis System, starting with surgical interventions aimed at
progressively augmenting the flexibility and efficiency of the extant TRIPS
architecture and venturing as far as fundamental revisions to the structure of
this treaty to enable free flow of patented pharmaceuticals from the Global
North to the Global South.
A. The unique potential of the Article 31bis System
The fallow state of the Article 31bis System has not gone unnoticed.
Commentators have posited that ECLs have been an unsuccessful experiment
that was condemned to failure by the limitations imposed by developed
Members.348 They propose that both human and financial resources should
be concentrated instead on obtaining cheap voluntary licenses from
patentees,349 bolstering medicine patent pools,350 and arranging humanitarian
aid campaigns,351 as these avenues have proven far more fruitful in
supporting developing Members in their struggle to provide satisfactory
public health standards to their citizens including access to medicines.
We fully recognize and welcome the successes achieved through these
pathways over the past decade, especially in the fight against the global
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Nevertheless, we believe that it would be a mistake to
jettison the Article 31bis System and discard ECLs entirely. First, voluntary
licensing, medicine patent pools, and humanitarian aid campaigns are
inextricably dependant on the collaboration and goodwill either of patent
holders or of third-party organizations. By contrast, having access to an
effective export compulsory licensing framework enables Members to take

348

See generally Halajian, supra note 203; Vincent, supra note 252; Harris, supra note

249.
349
See generally Brook K. Baker, A Sliver of Hope: Analyzing Voluntary Licenses to
Accelerate Affordable Access to Medicines Symposium: In Honor of Hope Lewis:
International Law, Local Justice: Human Rights Transformed, 10 NORTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 694 (2018).
350
The most notable example is the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) established by
UNITAID in 2010. The MPP negotiates licenses with HIV medicines patent holders and then
enters into sub-licensing contracts with generics manufacturers that agree to manufacture,
distribute and sell low-cost, high-quality treatments in underdeveloped regions. See
generally ‘T HOEN, supra note 2, at 73–76 (for a detailed analysis of the history and track
record of the MPP); Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and
Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines through Voluntary Licenses, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
LJ 291 (2012). Similarly, the WHO has recently created the Covid-19 Technology Access
Pool (C-TAP) to enable voluntary licensing of IP rights linked to treatments for Covid-19;
see World Health Organization, Operationalising The Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (CTap) A Concept Paper, available at https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/essentialmedicines/intellectual-property/who-covid-19-tech-access-tool-ctap.pdf?sfvrsn=1695cf9_36&download=true.
351
See Rachel Silverman et al., Tackling the Triple Transition in Global Health
Procurement, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2019) (analyzing data showing that aid
campaigns coordinated by NGOs and corporations finance over 40% of health expenditure
in developing countries); Baker, supra note 261, at 300–305 (analyzing the Pfizer donation
program and other similar initiatives).
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action unilaterally, on their own terms.
Second, pharmaceutical patent holders are far more likely to make
concessions, including price reductions, transfer of know-how, and voluntary
licenses if they are confronted by the spectre of compulsory licensing.352 For
Members that cannot rely on domestic compulsory licensing while their
pharmaceutical industries are developing, this tactic is only available if the
Article 31bis System is perceived as a functioning mechanism rather than a
hallow threat.
Third, empirical evidence reviewed in Part III showed that Members with
established medicinal production capabilities are regularly using domestic
compulsory licensing to obtain access to otherwise unobtainable patented
medicines. A corollary of this data is that voluntary arrangements with patent
holders and aid programs are not always viable or convenient. In such cases,
ECLs are the only option for Members without a developed domestic
pharmaceutical industry.353
Fourth, historically, compulsory licensing has been an inward-looking
instrument that countries deployed either to curtail patentee conduct
disruptive to local markets or to promote domestic policy aims. The Article
31bis System aspires to add a new dimension to this legal device, expanding
and transforming its functional profile. ECLs are intended to equip Members
with a tool the reach of which crosses borders, despite the territorial nature
of the patent system. They embody a solidaristic mechanism designed to
allow developing countries to benefit from the technological prowess of
foreign pharmaceutical industries at affordable prices. Though it is
undeniable that Article 31bis has not yet borne fruit, the ambitious idea at its
core holds great promise. It should not be abandoned due to a flawed
implementation. We believe that instead, efforts should be made to maximize
the potential of the Article 31bis System.
B. Pooled Procurement Strategies
Part III.D highlighted that economic challenges are one of the key factors
undermining the Article 31bis System. In particular, one of the primary
obstacles faced by prospective export compulsory licensees is achieving
economies of scale due to the typically small market size of Members eligible
to be Importing States. We believe that the TRIPS legal framework presents
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See Urias & Ramani, supra note 283 (reviewing a vast body of empirical evidence
and concluding that a compulsory licensing event is likely to reduce the price of the affected
patented drugs); Beatrice Stirner, Learning from Practice: Compulsory Licensing Cases and
Access to Medicines, 1 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT ANALYST 555 (2012) (highlighting the
impact of compulsory licensing in lowering drug prices); see also Reed F. Beall et al.,
Compulsory Licensing Often Did Not Produce Lower Prices For Antiretrovirals Compared
To International Procurement, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 493 (2015) (highlighting that there is a
risk for compulsory licensing to yield “suboptimal value when compared to the alternative
of international procurement … when used by low-income countries to manufacture
medicines locally.”).
353
See supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text.
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latent opportunities to countervail this issue through pooled procurement
strategies. Two approaches warrant close consideration.
First, Article 31bis(3) establishes that a Member participating in a
customs union or a free-trade association, half the membership of which is
comprised of LDCs, can export unreservedly any patented pharmaceutical
which it has manufactured or imported under a compulsory license
throughout this economic area.354 This is a meaningful exception to the
restriction imposed by Article 31(f),355 with the declared aim of “harnessing
economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for, and
facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products”.356
Article 31bis(3) has substantial implications for export compulsory
licensing. By virtue of this provision, rather than having to act separately,
Members party to an eligible trade agreement can notify the TRIPS Council
jointly and express their intent to import a determinate pharmaceutical in the
quantity required for their collective need.357 By pooling their demand,
Importing States can present a more palatable risk-reward proposition for
prospective licensees by offering better economies of scale, and, in turn,
reducing marginal production costs to a level that renders a high-volume-low
margin business strategy viable.
Beyond its effect on the economic dimension of export compulsory
licensing, as suggested first by Abbott and Reichman,358 Article 31bis(3) can
be leveraged to improve significantly the position from which Members
participating in eligible regional trade arrangements negotiate with
pharmaceutical patent holders. Imagine that a group of states, half of which
LDCs, entered into a multilateral treaty designed to eliminate all duties and
non-tariff barriers affecting the commerce of pharmaceutical and medical
equipment. Consider further that this international law instrument provided

354
See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31bis(3) (“where a developing or least developed
country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade agreement … at least half of the current
membership of which is made up of countries presently on the United Nations list of least
developed countries, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) shall not apply to the
extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a
compulsory licence in that Member to be exported to the markets of those other developing
or least developed country parties to the regional trade agreement that share the health
problem in question”). It should be noted that the customs union or trade agreement in
question must comply with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision on Differential
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, 28th November 1979 (L/4903, BISD 26S/203).
355
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
356
TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 31bis(3) (“With a view to harnessing economies of scale
for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production of,
pharmaceutical products”).
357
See TRIPS, supra note 18, Appendix to The Annex To The Trips Agreement note 4
(“Joint notifications providing the information required under this subparagraph may be
made by the regional organizations referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 31bis on behalf of
eligible importing Members using the system that are parties to them, with the agreement of
those parties.”).
358
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 2, at 973–76 (discussing extensively the
potential benefits of organized pool procurement at a regional level).
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that its signatories agreed to the creation of a regional entity to which they
conferred the necessary powers to organize the procurement of
pharmaceuticals and issue ECLs on their behalf. Pursuant to governmental
instructions, this regional entity would negotiate directly with pharmaceutical
patent holders to source the required medicines to satisfy the demand of the
entire trading bloc. Article 31bis(3) would decisively strengthen the
bargaining position of the regional entity in question in these interactions, as
patentees would be aware that failure to reach an acceptable voluntary
agreement would likely lead to one of the following two scenarios.359
Firstly, if one of the countries had the necessary manufacturing
capabilities to produce the pharmaceutical product in question, it would issue
a domestic compulsory license with the aim of supplying all other countries
party to the trade agreement. Secondly, if the required technology and knowhow were not present in any one of the countries involved in the regional
trade agreement in question, the regional entity could notify the TRIPS
Council, triggering the Article 31bis System on behalf of the whole trading
bloc.360 Confronted with such prospects and provided that the offered terms
were not beneath their marginal costs, patent holders would likely prefer
striking a deal with the regional entity, as they would at least preserve their
presence in the region, secure market share and increase their good will and
trademark visibility.
We believe that Article 31bis(3) holds great promise, and that it has not
received the attention it deserves. Only recently have Members party to
eligible regional trade agreements begun to explore its possibilities with
conviction. For example, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC)361 has recently developed an interest in exploiting Article 31 and
31bis through regionally pooled procurement, as evidenced in its
Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2013-2017 and more recently with the creation
of its Pooled Procurement Services System for pharmaceuticals.362 The East
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See Id. (arriving at this same conclusion).
360
See supra note 357.
361
Originally stemming from the Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference of 1980, the SADC is a regional economic community founded in 1992 and
consisting of 16 countries: Angola, Botswana, Comoros Islands, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; see Consolidated
Text of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (adopted 17 August
1992,
last
amended
21
October
2015)
available
at
https://www.sadc.int/files/5314/4559/5701/Consolidated_Text_of_the_SADC_Treaty__scanned_21_October_2015.pdf.
362
See Ellen F.M. ‘t Hoen et al., Patent Challenges in the Procurement and Supply of
Generic New Essential Medicines and Lessons from HIV in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Region., 11 J. PHARM. POLICY PRACT. (2018) (detailing
the efforts of the SADC and highlighting that the SADC Pharmaceutical Business Plan 2015–
2019 expressly proposes to “utilise the paragraph 6 system (Doha Declaration) or article 31
bis of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate local production for export; or importation for reexportation within SADC as a regional bloc.”); Chikosa Banda, Intellectual Property and
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Africa Community (EAC)363 has similarly striven to establish a regionally
pooled procurement mechanism for some time,364 although it has only latterly
taken more resolute steps in this direction.365
Unfortunately, these encouraging steps have not generated meaningful
progress to date. Members involved in these regional trade agreements have
struggled to institute and operate an entity responsible for pharmaceutical
procurement on their behalf. It can only be hoped that, in the wake of the
Covid-19 pandemic, these initiatives will gain momentum.366 Some
encouraging early evidence has been seen in a recent agreement signed by
Cabo Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritius, São Tomé
and Príncipe and Seychelles, with the aim of jointly procuring drugs and
vaccines to improve quality of and access to medicines.367
Having recognized the inherent value of Article 31bis(3), it should also
be acknowledged that this provision has an intrinsic ceiling. The condition
restricting the scope of application of this provision to regional trade
agreements half the membership of which is comprised of LDCs sharply
restricts its reach. At present, only multilateral trade arrangements involving
Members in Sub-Saharan Africa satisfy the requirement in question.

Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals: Recent Law and Policy Reforms in the Southern Africa
Development Community Region Symposium: Clinical Trials and Access to Essential
Medicines in African Countries, 31 MD. J. INT’L L. 44 (2016) (detailing reforms across
SADC members aimed at exploiting Article 31bis).
363
Originally founded in 1967, the EAC in its present incarnation was founded in 1999.
It is a regional economic community consisting of 6 countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,
South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. See Treaty Establishing the East African Community,
Nov. 30, 1999, 7 AFR. INT’L. L. 421, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255.
364
See Treaty Establishing the East African Community, supra note 255, art. 118,
(“Partner States undertake to: (a) expressing take joint action towards the prevention and
control of communicable and non-communicable diseases and to control pandemics and
epidemics of communicable and vector-borne diseases …; (c) develop a common drug policy
which would include establishing quality control capacities and good procurement
practices”).
365
See generally Hiiti Sillo et al., Coming Together to Improve Access to Medicines:
The Genesis of the East African Community’s Medicines Regulatory Harmonization
Initiative, 17 PLOS MEDICINE (describing the African Medicines Regulatory Harmonization
(AMRH) Initiative). In addition to the AMRH project, the EAC introduced a legal common
market protocol in 2019 that provides a non-discrimination clause for public procurement
among member states; see generally Omolo Joseph Agutu & Eurallyah Akinyi, The National
Treatment Rule and the Regulation of Public Procurement under the East African
Community Common Market Protocol, 5 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 115 (2019).
366
For a description of the regional response to Covid-19 in Africa see generally Samuel
Ojo Oloruntoba, Unity Is Strength: Covid-19 and Regionalism in Africa, 56 THE
INTERNATIONAL SPECTATOR 56 (Routledge Apr. 2021); Abbott & Reichman, supra note
243, at 550–58 (positing that pooled procurement strategies could play a crucial role to
overcome the Covid-19 pandemic in Africa).
367
See World Health Organization, African Island States Launch Joint Medicines
Procurement Initiative, 29 September 2020, available at https://who-africa.africanewsroom.com/press/african-island-states-launch-joint-medicines-procurementinitiative?lang=en.
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Members in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and South-East
Asia which would equally benefit from the demand aggregation mechanism
afforded by Article 31bis(3) are precluded from accessing it due to the
absence of a sufficient number of LDCs in these regions.368 This is
particularly lamentable when considering that some of these geographies
already have regional procurement entities in operation such as The
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States’ Pharmaceutical Procurement
Scheme (OECS-PPS), and the Gulf Cooperation Council Group Purchasing
Program.
Second, even for Members not party to regional trade agreements within
the scope of Article 31bis(3), there are pooled procurement strategies that
might be pursued to maximize the potential of the Article 31bis System.
TRIPS does not preclude Members from engaging the Article 31bis System
in unison. Acting as a de facto consortium, a group of countries could
contemporaneously but separately notify the TRIPS Council of their intention
to import a particular patented pharmaceutical product. Leveraging their joint
demand, these Members could then bargain collectively and offer terms that
would be more likely to attract prospective licensees. A material shortcoming
of pooled procurement strategies falling outside of the perimeter of Article
31bis(3) is that each individual Importing State would be barred from reexporting the drugs in question. Nevertheless, this hurdle could be overcome
through careful ex ante planning on the part of each participant in these
consortia. In areas such as Latin America, where there are almost no LDCs
but many economies with limited pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities,
coordinated recourse to export compulsory licensing could muster
significantly greater bargaining power than a single Member acting alone.
C. Law Reform
The preceding discourse has suggested that, in determinate
circumstances, pooled procurement strategies can enable Members to
overcome some of the economic obstacles that impede the extant Article
31bis System. Nevertheless, these are mitigating strategies. It is inescapable
that the current body of rules is deficient. We believe that for ECLs to fulfill
their promise, law reform is required.
In the first instance, the procedural dimension of the Article 31bis System
should be radically recalibrated. The normative aim guiding this intervention
should be to rebalance the current fixation on preventing diversion and
verifying the eligibility of the Importing State with equivalent, if not greater,
attention to simplicity, flexibility and expeditiousness. When notifying the
TRIPS Council, rather than having to specify the exact quantity of
pharmaceuticals required ex ante, Importing States should be allowed to state
an indicative range. Moreover, they should have the option to amend their
notification ex post to increase the previously-specified total, provided that
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See supra note 165.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4039264

?

FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF TRIPS ARTICLE 31BIS



their situation of need persists.
The application of Article 31(b) to the compulsory licenses granted by
Exporting States should also be reconsidered. Under this provision,
prospective licensees must make “efforts” to obtain a voluntary license from
patentees “on reasonable commercial terms and conditions” for a “reasonable
period of time”, before a compulsory license can be lawfully granted. The
ratio of these preconditions is rooted in the assumption that the ensuing
production will enter the issuing country’s domestic market, where the
prospective compulsory licensee will be in competition with the patentee.
However, the prerequisites under consideration suit neither the aims nor the
dynamics of the Article 31bis System. Reflecting the aims of the Doha
Declaration, the objective standard for the Article 31(b) negotiations should
be revised from “reasonable commercial terms and conditions” to “terms and
conditions that reflect the humanitarian, social and economic circumstances
of the Importing State”. In similar vein, mindful of the lengthy multi-step
nature of the Article 31bis System procedure, the prescribed time limit for
negotiations should be reduced from a “reasonable period of time” to a
“brief” one.
In similar vein, the obligations imposed on the export compulsory
licensee to prevent diversion of the manufactured pharmaceuticals should
also be reconfigured. Moving away from the current rigid set of measures,
the Article 31bis System should introduce a flexible standard. Exporting
States should be allowed to grant compulsory licenses which prescribe antidiversion countermeasures appropriate to the actual circumstances of each
case. Such a rule would allow for a scalar approach. The onus placed on
export compulsory licensees would be minimal, when the risk of diversion is
low due to, for example, the pharmaceutical in question being in scarce
demand in developed markets, or difficult to smuggle owing to its storage
and conservation profiles. By contrast, if the risk of diversion were elevated,
the Exporting State would be at liberty to prescribe more onerous monitoring
duties, extending across production, transport and distribution. This elasticity
would open the door to innovative and cost-efficient technological solutions
– including NFC chips, GPS tracking and distributed ledgers – rather than
meagre reliance on coloring and shaping of products, as well as packaging.
Lastly, pooled procurement should be facilitated and further incentivized
within the Article 31bis System. The current requirement that confines the
operation of Article 31bis(3) to regional trade agreements half the current
membership of which is comprised of LDCs is extremely restrictive. A
different threshold should be set with sensitivity not just for LDCs but also
developing Members, as these countries often lack pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity, especially for biologics. Pooled procurement outside
of Article 31bis(3) should also be facilitated. When an Importing State
notifies the TRIPS Council of its need for a pharmaceutical product, other
Members should be allowed to join their request at any point in time by
sending their own notification. Such an adhesion mechanism would greatly
reduce coordination challenges and perhaps give rise to a snowballing effect,
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with a growing number of Members incrementally summating their demand
and, in turn, rendering the transaction more appealing for prospective
licensees.
An alternative approach to buttress the flow of patented pharmaceuticals
from the Global North to the Global South might involve reforming the
TRIPS patent regime, rather than the Article 31bis System. The most direct
avenue would be to recast fundamentally the legal treatment governing the
export of patented medicines. Members could agree to modify Article 30,
instituting a mandatory limitation to the rights of patentees whereby the
production of a patented pharmaceutical for the purpose of distributing it into
the market of a Member without manufacturing capacity would be positively
qualified as a non-infringing activity. Arguably, such a rule would be
consistent with the general conditions set in Article 30(1) for patent rights
“exceptions”, as it would be “limited”, and neither “unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent”, nor “unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties”.369 An amendment of this nature would require all
Members to adopt this rule this within their domestic legal order. Marking a
stark departure from current law, it would completely unshackle flows of
patented pharmaceuticals from Members that have developed manufacturing
capabilities towards those that do not.
A less drastic approach would involve Members agreeing to an
authoritative interpretation of Article 30 through a TRIPS Council
Decision.370 This declaratory act would clarify that it is consistent with the
TRIPS patent regime for Members to enact into their domestic patent laws
limited carve outs that prevent patentees from taking action against persons
who produce patented pharmaceuticals to export them to Members without
manufacturing capacity. This reform would not mandate that Members adopt
this exception, yet it would make this possible for those that so desired.
A still-narrower intervention would be for Members to amend TRIPS by
eliminating Article 31(f). More restrained than the preceding options, this
excision would not introduce an exception designed to allow generally
unrestricted export of patented pharmaceuticals. Rather, it would only allow
this activity within the confines of the TRIPS compulsory licensing regime.
Accordingly, a manufacturer in a developed Member that wanted to export a
patented drug to another Member without the consent of the patentee would
have to obtain a compulsory license, abiding by all the procedural and
substantive requirements under Article 31.
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See supra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
WTO Agreement, supra note 154, art. IX(2) (“The Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement
and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral
Trade Agreement in Annex 1, they shall exercise their authority on the basis of a
recommendation by the Council overseeing the functioning of that Agreement. The decision
to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members.”).
370
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Setting aside the legal implications for importing Members,371 the crucial
problem shared by all these prospective interventions is that they are unlikely
to ever attract the necessary political support. Similar proposals were
considered extensively in the months preceding the Doha Declaration, and
especially during the lapse of time between the Doha Declaration and the
Decision.372 Developed Members never showed any genuine interest in
endorsing the compression of pharmaceutical patentees’ rights that such
interventions would entail.373 Considering that both TRIPS modifications and
authoritative interpretations equally necessitate the support of three-fourths
of all Members to be approved by the WTO, it is highly improbable that such
profound revisions of Articles 30 and 31 will occur in the foreseeable future.
Thus, it is our view that it would be pragmatic to concentrate efforts on
reforming the Article 31bis System, as developed Members would find it
difficult to reject such initiatives, given their ostensible commitment to its
success.
CONCLUSION
The original TRIPS framework contained a crucial flaw. It sharply
curtailed access to patented medicines for some of the world’s most
vulnerable populations. In the 2001 Doha Declaration, the TRIPS Council
contritely acknowledged this failing and resolved to rectify it. Their solution
was the creation of export compulsory licensing through the Article 31bis
system. Regrettably, this novel instrument has failed to deliver on its
promised outcomes.
In this Article, we have contended that this is due neither to governmental
and corporate interferences, nor conflicting national laws and international
treaties. Though not insignificant, these factors are not determinative. Our
view is that the Article 31bis System is impaired by suffocating procedural
and substantive requirements that deter both Members and pharmaceutical
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For Members interested in importing pharmaceuticals manufactured abroad, these
three reform approaches would present unproblematic, identical scenarios. If either the
pharmaceutical in question were not patented in their jurisdiction or the domestic patentee
consented, there would be no need to enact special measures to allow such imports. Similarly,
no interventions would be required if the jurisdiction in question recognized a first sale
doctrine pursuant to which patentees’ rights are exhausted following lawful manufacture and
export of a patented product under a compulsory license issued in another country. Members
would have to issue a parallel compulsory license authorizing import only if the
pharmaceutical in question were protected by a patent in their jurisdiction, the relevant
patentee opposed inbound flows and their rights could not be deemed exhausted under the
applicable first sale doctrine.
372
See Abbott, supra note 199 (providing an exhaustive analysis of a range of possible
TRIPS reforms involving Articles 30 and 31 that would address the issue highlighted in the
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration).
373
See Abbott, supra note 2 (detailing the negotiations that followed the Doha
Declaration and explaining how the current Article 31bis System emerged following
developed Members rejecting reform proposals that would have fundamentally recast
Articles 30 and 31).
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manufacturers from making recourse to ECLs.
Despite acknowledging the severity of these defects, we believe that the
Article 31bis System nevertheless holds great potential. Rather than being
dismissed unceremoniously, it should be revised through targeted
interventions to address its current shortcomings. Within a reformed
framework, ECLs could cut across the territorial boundaries of the patent
system and enable developing countries to draw on the technology and knowhow of developed pharmaceutical industries at affordable prices. Such a seed
of solidarity is rarely, if ever, sown in the domain of international intellectual
property law. Given time and care, it may yet blossom.
***
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